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Abstract 
 
‘Civic integration’ programmes and tests for third-country nationals (TCNs) have increasingly become part of member 
states’ legislation implementing EC immigration law and the EU Framework on Integration. The civic dimension of 
integration consists of various programmes and tests requiring TCNs to demonstrate that they know and respect the 
receiving society’s history, institutions and values. This paper assesses the tensions inherent in the relationship between 
civic integration programmes and the principles of legal certainty, proportionality and non-discrimination. This paper 
compares national immigration legislation in four member states – Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands. It 
studies the personal and material scope of civic integration provisions as well as the political justifications promulgated 
by their governments for introducing these kinds of policies. This comparison enables us to identify the common deficits 
of these member states’ policies. We argue that by providing a supranational venue for the transferring and legitimising 
certain national policies that use civic integration to restrict immigration, the legitimacy and coherency of the EU 
immigration policy is profoundly affected by the same deficits. The consequences endanger some of the key principles 
upon which the EU legal system and its immigration policy have been built. That notwithstanding, we conclude that 
owing to the progressive Europeanisation of immigration policy, member states are no longer free to use integration as a 
derogative clause for TCNs to have access to rights and protection in the EU. 
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CIVIC INTEGRATION OF THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS 
NATIONALISM VERSUS EUROPEANISATION IN THE COMMON 
EU IMMIGRATION POLICY 
CEPS ‘LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE’/OCTOBER 2009 
SERGIO CARRERA & ANJA WIESBROCK
* 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between human mobility, diversity and the politics of identity in Europe has 
undergone profound transformation in legal and policy terms during the last phases of European 
integration. After the transfer in 1999 of the immigration domain to (shared) competence 
between the European Community (EC) and the member states, the European Commission has 
practised different modes or strategies of governance aimed at moving Europeanisation forward 
in an area traditionally embedded in national prerogatives and the principle of subsidiarity. Ten 
years later, the EU already offers a transnational body of law regulating several aspects of 
conditions for the entry and residence of third-country nationals (TCNs)
1 and their integration in 
Europe. 
While immigration falls within the remits of the legal and institutional provisions of Title IV of 
the EC Treaty, the extent to which the Community has an officially recognised competence to 
legislate on the integration of TCNs has been subject to much contestation between the 
European Commission and the member states. The struggle between nationalism and 
Europeanisation has been a major factor in the emergence of a dual normative framing of 
integration at the EU level, consisting of EC immigration law on the one hand and the 
Framework for the Integration of TCNs in the EU (henceforward the EU Framework on 
Integration) on the other. The latter has developed since 2002 through the traditional 
Community method of cooperation. The EU Framework on Integration makes use of soft-policy 
(non-legally binding or enforceable) instruments and networks, with the Commission playing a 
coordinating role in the exchange of national practices and experiences on the integration of 
TCNs among member states representatives.  
In developing a common EC immigration policy, some member states have managed to transfer 
to the common body of EC law a number of normative mechanisms aimed at preserving ‘their 
last word’ or power in the decision on who is included or excluded from security of residence 
and social solidarity. The sine qua non for having ‘more Europe’ in the area of immigration has 
been the incorporation of ingredients from member states’ own public philosophies and 
domestic policies on the integration of TCNs into European public responses. These ingredients 
allow member states to have even wider discretion than that already provided by EC directives 
when conferring rights and guarantees to TCNs. They also constitute tools in the hands of the 
nation-state to retain sovereignty over the regulation of migration and identity. This strategy has 
been applied particularly in the negotiations on legislative proposals on immigration within the 
Council and through the exchange of information on national integration policies. Integration 
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measures and conditions for TCNs are paradigmatic examples in this regard. Their introduction 
into EC law and policy has left the door open for member states to apply civic integration 
programmes, courses and tests when transposing EC immigration law in their domestic legal 
systems. 
The dynamics characterising the development of an EU immigration policy have favoured the 
emergence of a new understanding of the integration of TCNs. This new conceptualisation of 
integration and the functionality given to it is fundamentally transforming assumptions in this 
field, which have traditionally viewed integration policies for TCNs as something positive, 
given their role in promoting social inclusion, non-discrimination and access to rights. What we 
see now, however, is a certain official use of integration that is challenging these mainstream 
considerations and moving towards policies purporting goals and effects of a rather unexpected 
nature. In this context, integration has become a condition in the form of a test, programme or 
contract within immigration law in order for TCNs to become socially included, to acquire a 
regular residence status and to have access to family reunion. Thus, paradoxically, integration 
has come to mean a mandatory requirement in immigration law that TCNs be socially 
integrated. The integration of TCNs has become part of a restrictive immigration policy aimed 
at limiting the number of immigrants having access to security of entry, residence and family 
life. This concept of integration is therefore progressively mutating into a mechanism of social 
exclusion and insecurity of TCNs in the EU. 
‘Civic integration’ programmes, courses and tests have increasingly become part of countries’ 
national legislation implementing EC immigration law (e.g. Directives 2003/109/EC on the 
status of TCNs who are long-term residents and 2003/86/EC on the right to family 
reunification). They have also come to form part of the Common Basic Principles (CBPs) on 
immigrants’ integration, which intend to provide a shared definition of the integration of TCNs 
in the scope of the EU Framework on Integration. The civic dimension of integration requires 
TCNs to demonstrate that they know, understand and respect the receiving society’s history and 
institutions, as well as its common shared values and way of life (and even in some cases that 
they adhere to these latter aspects). The predominantly nationalistic, and to a certain extent 
patriotic, and subjective (indeterminate) juridical nature of the concept of civic integration 
allows member states to exercise even more discretion when deciding whether to grant EC 
rights and freedoms to TCNs as envisaged in EC immigration law.  
This paper assesses the tensions in the relationship between the civic integration of TCNs and 
the general principles seeking to guarantee the rule of law and fundamental rights in the 
common EC immigration policy. After outlining some conceptual clarifications of the ‘civic 
integration of TCNs’ in section 2, section 3 examines the ways in which the civic dimension of 
TCNs’ integration is currently framed in EC immigration law and the EU Framework on 
Integration, and offers some reflections about the origins and driving factors behind the 
proliferation of civic integration at the EU level. Section 4 moves on to study a selection of four 
EU member states (Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands), all of which currently 
apply civic integration measures in their respective immigration regimes. These member states 
have also proven to be among the most influential during negotiations on Directives 
2003/109/EC and 2003/86/EC, and in the exchange of practice on integration programmes 
through the National Contact Points (NCPs) on integration.
2 The national comparison addresses 
the internal and external dimensions of civic integration. It is structured around two main topics: 
first, the official and political justifications promulgated by each government for introducing 
these kinds of policies; and second, the personal and material scope of civic integration 
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provisions. This enables us to identify common dilemmas and deficits shared by the four 
member states in light of the principles of legal certainty, proportionality and non-
discrimination. Section 5 argues that by providing a supranational venue for transferring and 
legitimising certain national policies that use civic integration as a basis for a stringent 
immigration policy, the legitimacy and coherency of the EU approach is being profoundly 
affected by the very same deficits that characterise member states’ laws. This tension endangers 
some of the key principles upon which the EU legal system has been built and the very 
foundations of its immigration policy. That notwithstanding, we conclude that as a consequence 
of the progressive Europeanisation of immigration policy, member states are no longer 
completely free to use integration as a derogative clause for TCNs to have access to EU rights 
and guarantees. 
2.  The internal and external dimensions of civic integration 
What do we mean by ‘civic integration’? Our working definition of civic integration 
simultaneously refers to two aspects. First is the use of integration as a norm in immigration 
law. Second is the organisation of integration courses or introductory/orientation programmes, 
tests and contracts. These compel TCNs to demonstrate that they know, understand and respect 
the host society’s history and institutions, along with the common shared values (and symbols) 
of the nation-state and in some cases even those of the EU.
3 Civic integration therefore confers 
strong cultural and identitarian connotations on the juridical framing of the phenomena of 
human mobility and diversity. It can be considered a new discursive line intending to hide the 
much-contested classical logics of assimilation or acculturation.
4 This concept of integration is 
new, and it is assuming a role formerly played by nationality laws, chiefly as a condition for 
naturalisation.
5 
The adjective ‘civic’ illustrates the degree of integration that the state requires from the TCN in 
order to be legal, i.e. that of citizenship. Indeed, the functional aspects of integration as 
something related to a civic (citizenship) status have been transferred from nationality per se to 
immigration as a fundamental condition for regularity and access to rights and freedoms by non-
EU nationals. Immigrants are presented as the ‘abnormal ones’ in need of a process of 
normalisation or naturalisation into the imagined canon viewed as the ‘normal’ (and majority) 
way of life and identity.
6 Differences and complexities are presented as being and regarded as 
beyond the normality of life and the nation. Therefore, even though TCNs may not wish to 
renounce their own national identities and ‘naturalise’ into the perfect citizen,
7 the state will 
demand allegiance to a set of perceived values, customs and principles (rules of the game) for 
the person to be legal in accordance with national administrative law. TCNs will need to show 
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5 R. Bauböck, E. Ersboll, K. Groenendijk and H. Waldrauch (eds), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality, 
Volumes I and II: Comparative Analysis – Polices and Trends in 15 European Countries, IMISCOE 
Research, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. 
6 See M. Foucault, Les Anormaux, Cours au Collège de France: 1974 – 1975, Hautes Études, Paris: 
Gallimard Le Seuil, 1999; see also D. Bigo, “Security: A Field Left Fallow”, in M. Dillon and A. Neal 
(eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
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that they meet the juridical conditions that previously were only applied as requirements (and 
tests) for those wanting to cross the bridge towards national citizenship. Such conditions have 
now become central for being entitled to a regular status of residence.  
When assessing the use that some EU member states make of integration in immigration law, it 
is clear that there is both an internal and an external dimension:  
1)  The internal dimension takes the form of a programme, course, test or contract applying 
when a TCN has ‘newly’ entered the state’s territory and seeks to reside there legally. 
Here civic integration is used in relation to those labelled as ‘newcomers’ and those 
applying for permanent residence, as well as in the scope of family reunification. Civic 
integration often constitutes a condition or additional layer for holding a temporary 
residence permit or being granted permanent residence and therefore benefiting from a 
higher degree of security against expulsion. For TCNs, the internal dimension actually 
means the need to pass a programme or exam (or both) about history, institutions and 
values (symbols) to avoid a precarious and insecure residence status. The emphasis of the 
internal dimension is on access to social protection and security of residence. One of the 
most powerful sanctions for failing integration tests is the non-renewal of a temporary 
residence permit (and refusal to grant permanent residence) and therefore expulsion from 
the country. 
2)  The external dimension (or integration abroad) consists of an evaluation and a course 
administered by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the EU member states in non-
EU countries about the way of life and values of the nation-state involved. Integration is 
being subjected to a process of externalisation by which the state’s requirement for the 
individual to be integrated moves beyond its territorial borders towards the country of 
origin. The civic integration test acts as another immigration control and selection 
measure “at a distance”,
8 displaying its full managerial effects even before a person is 
actually allowed to move and enter the destination country. Hence, that person formally 
becomes an immigrant in accordance with the national immigration law of the destination 
country. The emphasis of the external dimension is on access to territory and reducing the 
number of entries based on family reunification. For the would-be migrant, civic 
integration abroad is another discretionary condition for having access to a visa and the 
right to move to EU territory. As later discussed, this dimension is the one that might raise 
some fundamental human rights implications. 
In both its internal and external facets, integration is configured as an additional criterion on the 
path towards legality and the entitlement to claim rights, security and protection. It performs the 
function of an additional rule for the state to manage, limit and select the regular channels of 
migration and the community of beneficiaries legitimised to claim social security and social 
solidarity. Access to rights and the politics of identity are therefore closely interlinked by the 
state immigration policy. This link calls upon the TCN to show adherence to national identity 
(the perceived way of life, values, symbols and traditions of the nation). Integration therefore is 
not regarded as a process of social inclusion and equalisation of rights and freedoms, but rather 
as a state requirement for the TCN to disappear into the homogenous national wholeness and 
another way for the state to promote national identity and nationalism within and beyond its 
territorial borders. In this sense, civic integration and the respect for diversity become opposing 
concepts. This opposition to diversity also challenges some of the principles upon which the 
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liberal democracies making up the EU, and the EU itself, are supposed to be based.
9 This 
version of integration conflicts with a rights-based approach to migration. It furthermore runs 
counter to social inclusion by fostering social exclusion and increasing the vulnerability and 
insecurity of individuals on the move and those non-EU nationals already resident in the Union.  
3. Civic  integration: The EU context 
Since the transfer of immigration to shared competence between the EC and the member states by 
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999,
10 and based on the political guidelines and policy priorities of the 
Council’s multi-annual programmes,
11 the Commission has managed to develop a supranational, 
normative framework in this domain. This framework provides a common (yet ‘minimal’) 
legislative setting for the conditions of TCN entry and residence. Europeanisation in this area has 
not been immune to multifaceted difficulties, however. These have mainly entailed member 
states’ hesitations about the added value of having ‘more Europe’ in migration policy, their 
resistance to transferring more of their domestic competences and discretionary powers to the EU, 
and the application of the unanimity voting rule in the Council in order for any legal migration 
initiative to be formally adopted.
12 Adding to these factors has been the lack of political will on the 
part of some member states to recognise formally that the EC has competence to legislate in the 
field of TCN integration based on the Treaties.
13 Such struggles have led to the emergence of 
alternative governance strategies by the Directorate-General of Justice, Freedom and Security (DG 
JFS) of the European Commission, which have materialised in a bifurcated regulatory framework 
where integration is subject to EU cooperation: EC immigration law and the EU Framework on 
Integration. It is important to underline that, unlike EC immigration law, the EU Framework on 
Integration does not fall into the category of law, but rather constitutes a soft-law/policy 
mechanism lacking any legally binding force upon the member states.  
The strategy pursued by certain member states representatives has been to transfer to the EU level 
some elements of their national immigration legislation, using integration as a norm in 
immigration law to retain even greater discretionary power when granting rights, security of 
residence and social solidarity to TCNs. Integration measures and conditions are key parts of this 
strategy, which has been implemented during negotiations on the legislative initiatives for legal 
immigration within the Council and through the exchange of practice on integration policies in 
the scope of the EU Framework on Integration. This has favoured certain member states’ 
transposition of the integration provisions included in EC immigration law in the form of civic 
                                                      
9 E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and 
Integration in the EU, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009(b). 
10 Refer to Art. 63 EC Treaty.  
11 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 
1999, SN 200/99, Brussels, 1999; see also European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, OJ C 53/1, 3.3.2005. 
12 With the exception of policies dealing with legal migration, the Council agreed in 2004 to move to the 
co-decision procedure all the remaining fields falling within the scope of Title IV of the EC Treaty (such 
as asylum, irregular immigration and border policies). See Council Decision 2004/927/EC of 22 December 
2004 providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community to be governed by the procedure set out in Art. 251 of that Treaty, OJ L 396/45, 31.12.2004. 
13 Nevertheless, this situation did not prevent the Council from adopting an entire financial framework at 
the EU level covering the integration of TCNs based on Art. 63 of the EC Treaty. See the Council 
Decision 2007/435/EC of 27 June 2007 establishing the European fund for the integration of third-
country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the general programme “Solidarity and 
Management of Migration Flows”, OJ L 168/18, 28.6.2007. 6 | CARRERA & WIESBROCK 
 
integration programmes, tests and courses, and their promotion as ‘good practices’ and ‘lessons 
learned’ in the EU Framework on Integration. The result has also been a profound change in the 
traditional understandings of the integration of TCNs in EC law and policy, which now allow 
room for nationalism to play a role when determining the allocation of EU rights and freedoms 
to TCNs.  
The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (October 2008) – aimed at providing the general 
principles for the common EU immigration policy that will be implemented in the years to come –
pointed out the need to develop integration policies in the EU stressing “respect for the national 
identities of the member states and the European Union and for their fundamental values”.
14 This 
point was echoed by the Vichy Declaration adopted at the European Ministerial Conference on 
Integration in November 2008 (also under the French presidency), which called for the 
development of “information material featuring content common to the member states on 
European values to be defined by each member state, which could also include their own 
values”.
15 The Vichy Declaration recalled the importance of developing European Modules for 
Migrant Integration (EMMI), which in the words of the European Commission would be regarded 
as “the building blocks for comprehensive integration strategies” and which would “start by 
addressing organization of language and civic courses on the host society’s history, institutions 
and the common shared values of the EU”.
16 Both the Pact and the Vichy Declaration are 
illustrative of the above-mentioned dynamics affecting the normative understandings of the 
integration of TCNs in EC law and policy, and of their origins. They first demonstrate how civic 
integration is increasingly gaining ground in the various EU approaches to integration within EU 
immigration policy. Second, they evidence the main foundations of the change, which too often 
originate in influential member states and are then progressively transferred to and spread across 
the EU level.  
Although the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the Vichy Declaration could be 
considered over-casuistic examples, they nonetheless reflect a general trend seen more widely in 
both EC immigration law and the EU Framework on Integration. A mapping of the different 
discursive approaches or conceptual perspectives of integration in EU law and policy from the 
1970s until now has been carried out elsewhere.
17 The results of that mapping exercise show 
different dynamics affecting the evolution of the concept and the official discourses of EU 
institutions on the integration of TCNs during the last three decades. The predominant EU 
approaches to the integration of TCNs have altered substantially from an understanding of 
integration as the security of residence, family reunification, access to economic and societal 
spheres, equal participation, fair treatment and non-discrimination. They have moved towards 
integration as an immigration rule and a derogative clause (exception) in the hands of member 
states conditioning the access of TCNs to socio-economic inclusion, rights and membership.
18 
                                                      
14 See European Council, 2887
th meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 11653/08, Presse (205), 
Brussels, 24 and 25 July 2008(a); see also European Council, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 
13440/08, Brussels, 24 September 2008(b); and also S. Carrera and E. Guild, The French Presidency’s 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum: Intergovernmentalism vs. Europeanism? Security vs. 
Rights?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 170, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, September 2008. 
15 See European Council, European Ministerial Conference on Integration (Vichy 3-4 November 2008) – 
Declaration, 14898/08, 9 December 2008, Brussels. 
16 European Commission, Strengthening actions and tools to meet integration challenges, Report to the 
2008 Ministerial Conference on Integration, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2008) 2626, 
Brussels, 8 October 2008(b).  
17 S. Carrera (2009a), op. cit.  
18 S. Carrera, Benchmarking Integration in the EU: Analysing the Debate on Integration Indicators and 
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This point has been sustained by Kostakopoulou, Carrera and Jesse (2009),
19 who state that “there 
has been a shift from equal treatment to conditioned membership as national conceptions of 
integration, and neo-national narratives seeking to preserve social cohesion and national values 
have been uploaded at the European level”. These new conceptions and official EU discursive 
lines on integration now include a civic dimension as a constitutive element. 
Two directives have been of especial importance when regulating the conditions for the entry, 
residence and family reunion of TCNs in the EU: the Directive concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents (2003/109/EC)
20 and that on the right to family 
reunification (2003/86/EC).
21 The Directive on TCNs who are long-term residents recognises an 
EC status of long-term resident for those who have resided for a period of five years in the 
territory of a member state in a regular status, and provides a set of social rights and freedoms 
attached thereto and protection against expulsion.
22 Art. 5 presents the conditional aspects of 
integration by saying that “Member States may require third-country nationals to comply with 
integration conditions, in accordance with national law”. The Directive on the right to family 
reunification establishes common standards and criteria for TCNs residing lawfully in a member 
state to be reunited with their family members.
23 It creates a subjective right to family 
reunification,
24 but Art. 7.2 stipulates that “2. Member States may require third-country nationals 
to comply with integration measures, in accordance with national law”. With regard to refugees or 
their family members, the integration measures referred to in this article may only be applied once 
the persons concerned have been granted family reunification. In stating that the integration 
measures will only apply to refugees and their family members after they have been granted 
family reunification, Art. 7.2 has left the door open for some member states to apply integration 
measures to all other TCNs not falling within this legal category – even before they have been 
granted family reunification and while they are still abroad in their country of origin (i.e. 
integration abroad). 
Moreover, Directive 2003/109/EC recognises a right to move to and reside in a member state 
other than that which has granted the EC status to the TCN. Those persons meeting the conditions 
for acquiring the EC status of long-term resident in a member state shall be recognised as   
 
                                                      
19 See D. Kostakopoulou, S. Carrera and M. Jesse, “Doing and Deserving: Competing Frames of 
Integration in the EU”, in E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: 
Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009; refer also to K. 
Groenendijk, “Legal Concepts of Integration in EU Migration Law”, European Journal of Migration and 
Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004, pp. 111–126. 
20 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents, OJ L 16/44, 23.1.2004. 
21 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251/12, 
3.10.2003. 
22 K. Groenendijk, “The Long-Term Residents Directive, Denizenship and Integration”, in A. Baldaccini, E. 
Guild and H. Toner (eds), Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and 
Policy, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 429–450. 
23 H. Oosterom-Staples, “The Family Reunification Directive: A Tool Preserving Member State Interest or 
Conducive to Family Reunification Unity?”, in A. Baldaccini, E. Guild and H. Toner (eds), Whose Freedom, 
Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 
451–488. 
24 K. Groenendijk, “Family Reunification as a Right under Community Law”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006(a), pp. 215–230. 8 | CARRERA & WIESBROCK 
 
beneficiaries of the freedom to move and reside for a period exceeding three months in the 
territory of member states other than the one that granted the status in the first place.
25 Art. 15.3 
provides that 
Member States may require third-country nationals to comply with integration measures, 
in accordance with national law. This condition shall not apply where the third-country 
nationals concerned have been required to comply with integration conditions in order to 
be granted long-term resident status, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5(2). 
Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, the persons concerned may be required to 
attend language courses. (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, those TCNs holding an EC long-term residence permit will be allowed to move and 
reside in a second member state without being subject to civic integration measures. The second 
member state can only apply the requirement for TCNs to attend language courses and will 
therefore have to recognise that s/he is already well integrated ‘civically’ into its receiving 
society. This provision therefore represents a de jure mutual recognition of civic integration 
decisions among the EU member states, and TCNs who are long-term residents in light of 
Directive 2003/109/EC cannot be asked to fulfil integration requirements in the second member 
state when moving and residing there.  
A similar move can be also seen within the EU Framework on Integration.
26 Here again, 
integration functions as a programme, course or module (within the country or abroad) that 
includes knowledge of and respect for national (and European) values, fundamental norms, 
principles and ‘ways of life’. This policy direction is illustrated when looking at the CBPs on 
integration.
27 The CBPs aim at  
•  assisting member states in formulating integration policies by offering them a simple, 
non-binding guide against which they can judge and assess their own policies, and which 
can serve as a basis for the EU to explore how existing EU instruments on integration can 
be developed further;  
•  serving as a foundation for the member states to explore how EU, national, regional and 
local authorities can interact in the development and implementation of integration 
policies; and  
•  helping the Council to reflect and agree on EU-level policies intended to support national 
and local integration policy efforts, particularly through EU-wide learning and knowledge 
sharing. 
The civic dimension of integration can be seen particularly in CBPs 2 and 4. CBP 2 states that 
integration implies respect for “the basic values of the EU”. This principle involves the obligation 
of “every resident in the EU” to adapt and adhere closely to the basic values of the Union and the 
laws of the member states. It also compels member states to ensure that all residents “understand, 
respect, benefit from, and are protected on an equal basis by the full scope of values, rights, 
responsibilities, and privileges established by the EU and Member State laws”.
28 CBP 4.1 
emphasises that “basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions is 
indispensable for integration”. Both CBPs therefore justify the introduction or legitimise the 
                                                      
25 See Chapter III of the Directive, Arts. 14-23. 
26 H. Urth, “Building a Momentum for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European 
Union”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, pp. 163–180. 
27 European Council, 2618
th meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, “Common Basic Principles 
on Immigrants Integration”, 14615/04, Brussels, 19 November 2004. 
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existence of civic orientation programmes at the national level. They also seek to establish the 
basis upon which the EMMI could be developed in the future.  
This justification for national civic integration programmes was confirmed later on by the DG JFS 
of the European Commission. The 2005 Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration 
(COM(2005) 389) put forward concrete measures to strengthen the practical applicability of the 
CBPs.
29 It also identified as cornerstones of this framework a series of “suggested actions or a 
road map” intending to provide some guidance to put the CBPs into practice at the national and 
EU levels. The Commission clarified that the package of actions was only “indicative and not 
exhaustive”, and left it to the member states “to set priorities and select the actions”. The 
following two proposed actions may be highlighted. First, in relation to CBP 2, the Commission 
called for “[e]mphasising civic orientation in introduction programmes and other activities for 
newly arrived third-country nationals with the view of ensuring that immigrants understand, 
respect and benefit from common European and national values”. (Emphasis added.) Second, as 
regards CBP 4.2, it suggested the organisation of introduction programmes for newcomers, 
offering courses and “previous knowledge of the country”, and it recommended  
[s]trengthening the integration component of admission procedures, e.g. through 
predeparture measures such as information packages and language and civic 
orientation courses in the country of origin…[o]rganising introduction programmes and 
activities for newly arrived third-country nationals to acquire basic knowledge about 
language, history, institutions, socioeconomic features, cultural life and fundamental 
values. (Emphasis added.) 
What could have been the major driving factors behind the progressive incursion of civic 
integration in EC immigration law and the EU’s integration policy?  
The role of certain member states during the negotiations in the Council on the Directives 
pertaining to legal immigration has been decisive.
30 The first version of the legislative proposals 
for Directives 2003/86/EC and 2003/109/EC presented by the European Commission closely 
followed the principles guiding the classical inclusionary vision of the integration of TCNs in 
EC law and policy. Yet the outcome of the negotiations in the Council led to the introduction of 
express references to integration measures and conditions within the body of both Directives. 
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands managed to transfer to the EU level integration policies 
and legal measures existing in their respective national immigration laws (or which were being 
debated in their parliaments) at the time of the negotiations. These policies and measures have 
later on offered the possibility, during transposition in the national arenas, to reinvigorate the 
civic dimension of integration and to use it as a condition for rights and security.  
The influence of specific member states is evidenced when looking at the discussions that took 
place in the Council rooms. Austria, Germany and the Netherlands were clearly in favour of 
adding the term ‘integration conditions’ to the main text. In response to doubts raised by other 
member state representatives about the difficulty of finding objective criteria to evaluate whether 
this requirement was fulfilled by TCNs, representatives from these three countries drafted a joint 
suggestion on 25 September 2002.
31 Their joint suggestion stresses that “[t]he primary aim of 
integration is the promotion of the self-sufficiency of so-called ‘newcomers’ and one of the main 
parts of integration policy is an integration programme”. The joint suggestion argued that 
                                                      
29 European Commission, Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the 
Integration of Third Country Nationals in the European Union, COM(2005) 389, Brussels, 1 September 
2005.  
30 For a detailed study of the negotiations within the Council, see S. Carrera (2009a), op. cit.  
31 See European Council, Document 12217/02, Brussels, 23 September 2002. 10 | CARRERA & WIESBROCK 
 
introducing the need to pass these integration programmes would constitute the actual ‘condition’ 
for granting long-term resident status. Furthermore, it stated that “sufficient knowledge of the 
country” should be an essential criterion for granting the status. In their opinion, this stipulation 
would be compatible with their respective national laws, under which newcomers were obliged to 
follow mandatory integration programmes from the moment such persons were legally residing in 
the member state, and the degree of integration was used as one of the conditions for granting the 
settlement permit. Moreover, it was pointed out that at that time the Netherlands was working on a 
legislative proposal to impose on specific groups of immigrants the obligation to cover the costs of 
integration programmes “before entering the Netherlands”, which later on materialised in the 
Integration Abroad Act (see section 4.1 below).
32 
In addition, the EU Framework on Integration has attributed great significance to the network of 
national ministerial officials – the NCPs – in the exchange and promotion of national policies 
incorporating civic integration measures in immigration law.
33 The NCPs have played a very 
important role in the exchange of information about national practices and policies on 
integration, as well as in the identification of best practice and knowledge sharing. The NCPs 
have become influential in the ways in which the Framework has been constructed and in the 
thinking around the kinds of policies to be developed in the future. They have participated in the 
drafting of three Commission annual reports on migration and integration,
34 and the two editions 
of the Handbook on Integration.
35 They have also provided a supranational forum prioritising 
certain policies, programmes and practices at the national level considered ‘good’ or in need of 
promotion across the entire EU.  
The Framework represents an innovative, multilevel method of governance on the integration of 
TCNs at the EU level, involving a package of non-binding or soft-law/policy elements and 
diversified supranational networks, which have given birth to a “quasi-open method of 
coordination”
36 that includes benchmarking and indicators as central tools. While the EU 
Framework on Integration lacks any legally binding effect for the member states, in 
                                                      
32 L.F.M. Besselink, “Unequal Citizenship: Integration Measures and Equality”, in S. Carrera (ed.), The 
Nexus between Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in the EU, CHALLENGE Collective Conference 
Volume, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2006. 
33 The establishment of the European network of NCPs was one of the first results of the JHA conclusions 
of October 2002. The European Commission created this transnational forum of experts from national 
administrations responsible for the integration of immigrants, which includes, depending on the member 
state, representatives from ministries of interior, ministries of labour and social affairs, ministries of 
integration, etc. The network is chaired by the DG JFS. 
34 See European Commission, Communication on the Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration, 
COM(2007) 512, Brussels, 11 September 2007; see also European Commission, Communication on the 
First Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM(2004) 508, Brussels, 16 July 2004; and also 
European Commission, Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration, Commission Staff Working 
Document SEC(2006) 892, Brussels, 30 June 2006. 
35 See J. Niessen and Y. Schibel, Handbook on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners, DG 
Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, November 2004; see also J. Niessen and Y. Schibel, Handbook on 
Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners, Second Edition, DG Justice, Freedom and Security, 
European Commission, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, May 
2007. 
36 S. Carrera, The Role and Potential for Local and Regional Authorities in the EU Framework on the 
Integration of Immigrants, study commissioned by the Commission for Constitutional Affairs, European 
Governance and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice of the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 
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combination with a sound financial framework through the European integration fund, it is 
slowly (yet progressively) making possible policy ambitions (through implementation of the 
CBPs and the exchange of practices) and actual legislative results (projects and programmes) 
across the various national arenas. In this way, the EU is financially supporting certain national 
approaches and public philosophies that conceive of integration from a ‘civic’ and ‘conditional’ 
perspective. It is also worth remembering that while the UK, Ireland and Denmark enjoy an opt-
out status from all the legislative measures adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty,
37 and 
therefore are not bound or obliged to transpose Directives 2003/86/EC and 2003/109/EC, the 
three of them nevertheless participate in the exchange of practices. Ireland and the UK have 
opted to take part in the European integration fund. 
Finally, the conceptual features of the CBPs adopted by the Council raise a whole series of 
concerns in relation to the respect of cultural diversity and the heterogeneous identities of TCNs. 
Spain was actually the only member state that presented an amendment within the Council to the 
finally-agreed list of 11 CBPs in 2004. It appears that the Spanish proposal, which sought to 
include an express reference to support for the maintenance of the languages and cultures of 
TCNs’ origins (recognition of the cultural identity of TCNs), was not very well received by the 
other member states.
 38 
4. Civic  integration: The national context 
This section presents a comparative account of civic integration programmes and legal measures 
in four EU member states: Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands. All of them are 
paradigmatic examples of the use of civic integration measures in immigration law. As shown in 
the previous section, they also happen to be very influential at EU-level discussions about 
immigration and integration policies. Indeed, their significant role in relation to the final output 
of the most relevant EU policies and legal measures so far adopted on immigration and 
integration further justifies our geographical selection. It also makes the comparison relevant 
when assessing the implications of the transfer of nationalistic integration policies into the 
common EU immigration policy in what concerns, most crucially, the rule of law and non-
discrimination.  
4.1  The external dimension of civic integration: Integration abroad 
The four EU member states under analysis present different versions of civic integration abroad 
in their immigration laws. In a nutshell, Denmark and the Netherlands use ‘in full’ the concept 
of civic integration abroad as a mandatory condition for the grant of a visa and lawful entry to 
would-be immigrants. French immigration law also presents integration abroad as a (in principle 
non-mandatory) requirement when granting a visa and includes programmes and an evaluation 
of not only language but also knowledge about the ‘values of the Republic’. Germany practises 
integration abroad as an obligatory condition, but only as regards German language proficiency 
and does not formally include a civic element.  
4.1.1 Purpose 
In this subsection, we address the official purpose and objectives presented by the governments 
of the four EU member states for the introduction of integration abroad tests.  
                                                      
37 See the Special Protocols attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, pp. 92–114. 
38 P. López Pich, “La Política de Integración de la Unión Europea”, Revista Migraciones, Vol. 22, December 
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The Netherlands was the first EU country to introduce integration abroad requirements. On 22 
December 2005, the Dutch parliament adopted an Integration Abroad Act (Wet inburgering in 
het buitenland), which entered into force on 15 March 2006.
39 Since 2006, immigrants have 
been required to demonstrate basic knowledge of the Dutch language and society when entering 
the Netherlands.
40 To justify the introduction of a new immigration requirement for family 
migrants, the explanatory memorandum
41 to the Integration Abroad Act refers to the 
marginalisation and lack of integration of a growing number of migrants in the Netherlands, 
among which a third come for the purpose of family reunification or family formation.
42 The 
government points out that the two largest groups of family migrants, Turkish and Moroccan 
nationals, often only possess a basic level of education, are frequently unemployed and are over-
represented in low-skilled jobs.
43 These characteristics are especially prominent among female 
family migrants from Morocco and Turkey, who are even less likely to be employed than their 
male counterparts are.
44 Family migrants from these groups are deemed to be in a disadvantaged 
position at the point of arrival in the Netherlands, inter alia, owing to their lack of Dutch 
language skills. The government refers to a repetitive phenomenon of chain migration 
(repeterende verschijnsel van volgmigratie) that has the effect of placing a continually growing 
number of ethnic minority groups in a disadvantaged position.  
The cabinet intends to put an end to this ‘process of marginalisation’ by requiring immigrants 
who are likely to face difficulties in integrating after arrival to start the integration process prior 
to departure.
45 The main official purpose of the Integration Abroad Act is thus to render the 
integration process of newcomers in the Netherlands more efficient and effective. In addition, 
the law was intended to have a motivating and emancipating effect. It places great emphasis on 
the individual responsibility of the potential newcomers and their partners. By making potential 
immigrants aware of the norms and values of the Netherlands, along with the importance of 
knowledge about Dutch society and language skills before entry, the newcomers are expected to 
be better prepared for a new life in the Netherlands. Still, behind the official objective of 
facilitating the integration process of newcomers is the more implicit aim of reducing the 
                                                      
39 L.F.M. Besselink, “Integration and Immigration: The Vicissitudes of the Dutch ‘Inburgering’”, in E. 
Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and 
Integration in the EU, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009. 
40 See Art. 16(1)(h) Vreemdelingenwet. 
41 See Memorie van Toelichting, Kamerstukken II, 2003–2004, 29 700 nr. 3. 
42 As opposed to the process of family reunification, the concept of family formation refers to the entry of 
a spouse or partner in cases where the marriage/partnership was only concluded after the sponsor was 
already living in the country. For further information about the different categories of family migration in 
the Netherlands, see E.M. Naborn, Gezinshereniging. De overkomst van gezinsleden van migranten en 
Nederlanders, Ministrie van Justitie, Wetenschappelijk onderzoek- en documentatie centrum (WODC), 
The Hague, 1992, pp. 5–6. 
43 According to a report of the Social and Cultural Planning Office, around 40% of Turkish and almost 
60% of Moroccan family migrants have at the most a basic level of education. Unemployment among 
Turkish and Moroccan family migrants is around 12% (in comparison with 3% of the native population). 
In 2002, 35% of Turkish and 42% of Moroccan family migrants who were employed had a low-skilled 
job; see J. Dagevos, M. Gijsberts and C. van Praag, Rapportage minderheden 2003, Sociaal en Cultureel 
Planbureau (SCP), Den Haag, 2003. 
44 For instance, 80% of Turkish women between the ages of 40 and 65 and 90% of Moroccan women in 
this age group have at most a basic level of education; see M. Gisberts and A. Merens, Emanciaptie in 
estafette: De positie van vrouwen uit etnische minderheden, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP)/ISEO, 
Den Haag and Rotterdam, 2004. 
45 See Memorie van Toelichting, Kamerstukken II, 2003–2004, 29 700 nr. 3. CIVIC INTEGRATION OF THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS | 13 
 
number of family migrants to the Netherlands. It follows from the explanatory memorandum to 
the Integration Abroad Act that the requirement to pass an integration exam abroad is intended 
to stimulate potential immigrants to carefully consider whether it is worth applying for 
admission to the Netherlands.
46  
This clearly illustrates the hidden objective of reducing the number of persons who are willing 
to undertake the effort and financial risk (the fee for the integration abroad test is €350, which 
must be borne entirely by the applicant) involved in taking the test to qualify for a provisional 
residence permit. A similar position was taken by the Council of State (Raad van State) when 
commenting on the introduction of the Integration Abroad Act in its advisory report.
47 
According to the Council of State, as it will lead to a reduction of family migrants, the new 
requirement constitutes a selection mechanism, which is not entirely plain from the explanatory 
memorandum. The purpose of the Integration Abroad Act as a tool for immigration control was 
reinforced by the government’s decision to raise the level of the test on 15 March 2008.
48 Based 
on an assessment carried out in 2007,
49 which showed that candidates had a higher level of 
language proficiency than expected and that a majority of applicants passed the test, the number 
of questions that must be answered correctly to pass the test increased. The conclusion that the 
level of the test must be raised if ‘too many applicants’ pass it reveals that a reduction in the 
number of family migrants entering the Netherlands was a crucial objective behind the 
introduction of a civic integration exam. 
The Danish parliament adopted a bill introducing an integration test for spousal reunification in 
April 2007.
50 When it enters into force as foreseen in 2010, the Act will require spouses 
applying for family reunification as well as foreigners seeking admission as religious preachers 
to have passed a Danish language proficiency test and a test on Danish society. According to 
amendments to the original bill agreed by the Danish government and the Danish People’s Party 
in 2008, the immigration test (indvandringsprøven) will have to be taken in Denmark and will 
be preceded by a pre-recognition assessment regarding the fulfilment of all other conditions for 
family reunification.
51 In the explanatory memorandum
52 to the bill, the minister for refugees, 
immigration and integration affairs explicitly referred to the Dutch integration test as a model to 
follow. The memorandum stated that the purpose of the pre-entry immigration test is to 
strengthen the individual migrant’s potential for a successful and rapid integration into Danish 
society. According to the Danish government, it must be assumed that foreigners who have 
passed the immigration test will be better equipped to participate in the integration process and 
that foreigners who are not able to pass the immigration test are likely to face substantial 
difficulties in integrating into Danish society. The immigration test is seen as a supplement to 
the international dimension of integration in Denmark that will help ensure that each person 
wishing to reside in Denmark makes an effort towards his/her integration at an early stage and 
                                                      
46 Ibid. 
47 Wijziging van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000 in verband met het stellen van een inburgeringsvereiste bij 
het toelaten van bepaalde categoriëen vreemdelingen (Wet inburgering in het buitenland), Advies Raad 
van State en nader rapport, Kamerstukken II, 2003–2004, 29 700 nr. 4.  
48 See Kamerstukken II, 2006–07, 29 700, nr. 40. 
49 P.F. Sanders, Onderzoek naar de kwaliteit van het inburgeringsexamen buitenland, TNO-rapport TNO-
DV 2007 C053, Research Center voor Examinering en Certificering, Cito en Universiteit Twente, 
Arnhem, 2007.  
50 See Lov no. 379 of 25 April 2007 om ændring af udlændingeloven og lov om aktiv socialpolitik. 
51 E. Ersbøll, “On Trial in Denmark”, in R. Van Oers, E. Ersbøll and D. Kostakopoulou (eds), A re-
definition of belonging? Language and integration tests in Europe, Leiden: Brill, 2009 (forthcoming). 
52 See Lovforslag no. L 93 om lov om ændring af udlændingeloven og lov om aktiv socialpolitik. 14 | CARRERA & WIESBROCK 
 
demonstrates the motivation and desire to become part of Danish society. With regard to 
religious preachers, it is expected that the immigration test will help them acquire a better 
understanding of the ‘social environment’ in Denmark for the pursuit of their religious 
activities.
53  
When looking at the implicit objective of introducing an external dimension for civic 
integration, it is notable that the government refers to the example of the Netherlands, where the 
introduction of an integration abroad requirement has led to a dramatic decrease in the number 
of applications for family reunification. According to a note of the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights,
54 it can be expected that the introduction of the pre-entry integration test in Denmark 
will equally lead to a decrease in the number of applications for family reunification. More 
specifically, many foreigners (and especially those who are poorly educated) are likely to refrain 
from attempting to pass the test because they doubt whether they will be able to do so and are 
unwilling or unable to assume the necessary expenses. Yet, in response to a question from the 
Standing Committee on Foreigners and Integration Policy, the minister for integration claimed 
that the test was not aimed at reducing the number of family migrants.
55 
The external dimension of civic integration was introduced in France by Law No. 2007-1631 of 
20 November 2007.
56 This law represented a major transformation of the classical, republican 
integrationist philosophy.
57 One of the main official justifications offered by the French 
government for this legislative reform to take place was the need to transpose into French law the 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification. In particular, the original 
explanatory memorandum of the first version of the proposed law stated that the integration 
requirements applied to applicants for family reunification above 16 years of age are in line with 
Art. 7.2 of Directive 2003/86/EC, which offers member states the possibility to introduce 
integration measures in the country of origin in accordance with national law:  
fait application de ce dispositif de préparation au parcours d’intégration républicaine 
aux étrangers de plus de seize ans pour lesquels est sollicité le bénéfice du regroupement 
familial.  Ces dispositions sont dans le droit fil de la directive 2003/86/CE du 22 
septembre 2003 relative au droit au regroupement familial qui, dans son article 7, 
paragraphe 2, prévoit que les États membres peuvent exiger des ressortissants de pays 
tiers qu’ils se conforment aux mesures d’intégration dans le respect du droit national. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The case of the Netherlands was also referred to as a model during the debates preceding the 
adoption of the law. Similar to the Dutch and Danish cases, the first paragraph of the explanatory 
memorandum of the original Projet de Loi also made reference to the high number of residence 
permits granted so far in France based on family reunification in comparison with other channels 
                                                      
53 Ibid., pp. 8–9.  
54 E. Ersbøll and E.M. Lassen, “Notat vedrørende lovforslag nr. L 93 om lov om ændring af 
udlændingeloven og lov om aktiv socialpolitik”, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Copenhagen, 2007. 
55 See Ersbøll (2009), op. cit. 
56 Loi no. 2007-1631, 20 novembre 2007 relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à 
l’asile, J.O. no. 270, 21 novembre 2007, and also the other versions, Projet de Loi relatif à la maîtrise de 
l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile, Assemblée Nationale no. 57, 4 juillet 2007; and Projet de Loi 
relatif à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile, no. 11, Sénat, adopté le 23 octobre 2007. 
See also V. Guiraudon, “Integration Contracts for Immigrants: Common Trends and Differences in the 
European Experience”, Commentary, Real Instituto Elcano, 7 May 2008 (retrieved from 
www.realinstitutoelcano.org). 
57 C. Laborde, “The Culture(s) of the Republic: Nationalism and Multiculturalism in French Republican 
Thought”, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2001, pp. 716–735. CIVIC INTEGRATION OF THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS | 15 
 
of ‘legal’ immigration.
58 That notwithstanding, according to the official data offered by Secrétariat 
général du comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration,
59 there has been a decline in the 
number of entries to the country on this basis since 2006, prior to the application of the new 
immigration law and civic integration abroad (Table 1). The same report acknowledges that the 
“strong and spectacular” decrease in the number of residence permits granted for the purposes of 
family reunification (down by 10.6%)
60 has been a consequence of the government’s enactment of 
important legislative amendments limiting the past “misuses and abuses” that had apparently 
occurred in the scope of family reunification.
61 The report also states that it is expected that the 
number will fall even further during 2008 and 2009 in light of making the grant of a visa for 
family reunification subject to the examination of the applicant’s knowledge of the French 
language and republican values.  
Table 1. Number of entries granted in France for family reunification, 2003–07 
 2003 2004  2005 2006 2007 
No. of entries  23,423  23,310  22,994  19,419  18,891 
Source: Secrétariat général du comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration (2008). 
In  Germany, a language test as a precondition for spousal reunification was introduced in 
2007.
62 According to Section 30(1) No. 2 of the Residence Act (as amended), incoming spouses 
must be able to demonstrate basic knowledge of the German language to be granted a residence 
permit for the purpose of family reunification. As the pre-entry language requirement does not 
contain any civic element, however, a discussion of its official and implicit objectives goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.
63  
                                                      
58 C. Borrel, “Enquêtes Annuelles de Recensement 2004 et 2005: Près de 5 million d’immigrés à la mide de 
2004”, Cellule Statistiques et études sur immigration, INSEE Première No. 1098, INSEE, Paris, August 
2006. 
59 Secrétariat général du comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration, Les orientations de la 
politique de l'immigration – Cinquième rapport établi en application de l'article L.111-10 du code de 
l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile, La Documentation française, Paris, 2008 (retrieved 
from www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr). 
60 This data corresponds with the total number of residence permits falling within the category of family 
reunification: famille de Français (–8.8%), regroupement familial (–2.7%), carte de séjour portant la 
mention “Vie privée et familiale” – autre que celle attribuée pour raisons médicales (–21.8%). 
61 More specifically, the report explicitly states that “La diminution du nombre de titres délivrés pour 
motifs familiaux est d’une telle ampleur qu’elle peut être regardée comme marquant une véritable rupture. 
Elle est le fruit des réformes importantes engages par le gouvernement pour limiter les détournements de 
procédure et les abus auxquels donnait lieu l’application du droit de l’immigration familiale” (p. 13). 
62 Gesetz zur Umsetzung aufenthalts- und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien der Europäische Union, BGBl. I, p. 
1970. 
63 For insight into the objectives for introducing a pre-entry language test in Germany, see Gesetzentwurf 
zur Umsetzung aufenthalts- und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien der Europäischen Union, Bundestag 
Drucksache 16/5065, 23 April 2007, p. 173; see also R. Hofmann and H. Hoffmann, Ausländerrecht: 
Handkommentar, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008, § 30, Rn. 26; and A. Wiesbrock, “Discrimination instead 
of Integration? Integration Requirements in Denmark and Germany”, in E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. 
Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Aldershot: 
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4.1.2 Material  scope 
This section examines the ways in which civic integration is tested and the content/questions 
asked. It looks at how far national rules can be considered in accordance with the law and 
necessary in a democratic society from the perspectives of principles on proportionality and 
legal certainty. 
In  the Netherlands, according to Art. 16(1)(h) of the Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet), an 
application for a temporary residence permit may be denied if a foreigner, who is categorised as 
a ‘newcomer’ pursuant to the Integration Act (Wet inburgering) and who does not fall within 
one of the exceptions, fails to demonstrate a basic knowledge of Dutch language and society. 
Passing the test is a precondition for the acquisition of a provisional residence permit 
(Machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf, MVV). It follows from the preparatory documents for Art. 
16(1)(h) Vreemdelingenwet
64 and Art. 3.71a of the Aliens Decree (Vreemdelingenbesluit)
65 that 
the legislator intended to apply the integration requirement in the context of the MVV 
procedure, therefore granting the minister of justice the competence to deny authorisation for 
temporary stay for the purpose of family reunification if the integration condition has not been 
fulfilled. A challenge to the requirement of integration abroad based on the fact that the 
integration condition referred to in Art. 16 Vreemdelingenwet is not explicitly contained in the 
Vreemdelingebesluit was annulled by the Administrative Judicial Division of the Council of 
State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, ABRvS) on 2 December 2008.
66 
The requested knowledge has to be proven by way of passing an integration test abroad, as 
specified in the Integration Abroad Act. The test is carried out in Dutch embassies, where 
potential immigrants talk on the telephone with a language computer. The test consists of two 
components, namely a civic one and a language one.  
As regards the content of the component on knowledge of Dutch society (Kennis van de 
Nederlandse samenleving), applicants are asked a number of questions on the following topics: 
1) the geography of the Netherlands, along with Dutch housing and transport; 2) Dutch history; 
3) the Dutch constitution, government, democracy and legislative system; 4) the Dutch language 
(and why it is important to learn it); 5) parenting and education; 6) the health care system; and 
7) work and income. The civic part of the test takes approximately 15 minutes, followed by a 
Dutch language test of another 15 minutes. Applicants have to obtain at least 70 points in the 
civic test and 16 points in the language test to pass. The necessary preparation for the test is 
entirely the responsibility of the potential applicants, who may acquire a ‘practice pack’ costing 
approximately €70 from retailers in the Netherlands or online bookstores. The practice pack 
contains a CD with all 100 questions that could be asked during the exam, a film about the 
Netherlands, a book with pictures from the film and three practical language tests. The video 
has been criticised for drawing a stereotypical picture of the Netherlands and apparently 
targeting Muslim migrants.
67 
                                                      
64 Memorie van toelichting, Kamerstukken II, 2003–2004, 29 700, No. 3, p. 8; Nota naar aanleiding van 
het verslag, Kamerstukken II, 2004–2005, 29 700, No. 6, p. 52. 
65 Nota van toelichting, pp. 5 and 15, Stb. 2006, 94. 
66 See Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, 2 December 2008, nr. 200806120/1 (retrieved 
from www.raadvanstate.nl); see also the following judgment, in which the reasoning of the ABRvS was 
applied: Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, zittingsplaats ‘s-Hertogenbosch, 12 January 2009, AWB 08/7556, 
LJN: BG9517, paras. 8 and 9. 
67 See A. Etzioni, “Citizenship Tests: A Comparative, Communitarian Perspective”, Political Quarterly, 
Vol. 78, No. 3, 2007, pp. 353–363; see also Human Rights Watch, “The Netherlands: Discrimination in  
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The Danish indvandringsprøven contains a civic and a Danish language element. The civic part 
will test family migrants on their knowledge about Denmark and Danish society. This implies 
that the foreigner must have acquired an insight into Danish norms, values and fundamental 
rights, including knowledge about Danish democratic principles, individual freedoms and 
personal integrity, belief and expression, gender equality and women’s rights. The same applies 
to more practical issues, such as the prohibition of violence and false marriages, 
parenting/parental responsibilities, health and work.
68 The applicant will be required to assume 
responsibility for obtaining the necessary skills and preparing for the test. Consequently, the 
Danish authorities will not offer preparatory courses but potential family migrants will be able 
to prepare for the test based on a training package, which can be purchased from the Danish 
authorities. The costs for the immigration test will have to be entirely covered by the applicant, 
who can have several chances to pass. The test has to be passed prior to submitting an 
application for a residence permit, however, and as such forms an additional immigration 
condition.
69 
The French Decree 2008-1115 implementing Law 2007-1631 includes all the details for the 
practical application of the French programme on civic integration abroad.
70 The competent 
public authority in charge of organising the courses and the evaluation is the Office français de 
l'immigration et de l'intégration (OFII).
71 Art. R. 311-30-1 provides that the latter can delegate all 
or some of these functions to third parties (organismes), something that leaves the door open for 
the involvement of the private sector in the delivery and testing of civic integration.
72 Art. 1 of 
Law 2007-1631 added a new Art. L. 411-8 in the Code for the entry and residence of foreigners 
and the right to asylum (Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile, CESEDA). 
It states that 60 days after the presentation of an application for family reunification, every TCN 
over 16 and under 65 years old will be subject to an evaluation carried out by the OFII about 
his/her knowledge of the French language and the values of the Republic.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
the Name of Integration, Migrants Rights under the Integration Abroad Act”, Human Rights Watch, New 
York, 14 May 2008 (retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/05/14/netherlands-discrimination-
name-integration). 
68 Lovforslag nr. L 93 om lov om ændring af udlændingeloven og lov om aktiv socialpolitik, pp. 8–9. 
69 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 
70 Décret no. 2008-1115 du 30 octobre 2008 relatif à la préparation de l’intégration en France des 
étrangers souhaitant s’y installer durablement, J.O. du 1 novembre 2008. 
71 The mission of the office is two-fold: first, reception and assistance for foreigners during their 
migration process towards France and second, assistance to French nationals when migrating abroad (see 
the website http://www.ofii.fr). The office was established by Décret no. 2009-331 du 25 mars 2009 
substituant la dénomination « Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration » à la dénomination 
Agence nationale de l’accueil des étrangers et des migrations, NOR: IMIC0828706D, 27 mars 2009. It 
was previously called the Agence nationale de l’accueil des étrangers et des migration, which was first 
established on 25 July 2005. This agency has centralised two previous administrative bodies that formerly 
dealt with these fields: l’Office des migrations internationales (OMI) and le Service social d’aide aux 
émigrants (SSAE). 
72 I. Michalowski, “Liberal States – Privatized Integration Policies?”, in E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. 
Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Aldershot: 
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How is the knowledge of ‘republican values’ examined in practice? Art. R. 311-30-2 states that 
the test will take the form of a series of oral questions in a language that the applicant will 
understand. Reference is made to Art. R. 311-22 of the CESEDA, which stipulates that the civic 
curriculum consists of “the presentation of French institutions and the values of the Republic, 
especially in relation to the equal treatment between men and women, secularism, rule of law, 
fundamental liberties, security of persons and goods as well as the exercise of citizenship, which 
allows most especially access to obligatory and free education”. The duration of the training is 
later on specified in an Arrêté of 1 December 2008.
73 The participation of the foreigner in the 
programme is approved by the issue of a registration certificate by the OFII, which is distributed 
by the actor that delivered the programme abroad. The level of knowledge about the values of the 
Republic is considered satisfactory when the foreigner correctly answers five out of six questions. 
If the applicant fails the values part of the first-level evaluation, a further course of three hours will 
be prescribed according to Art. 3 of the Arrêté.  
The evaluation results concerning knowledge of French republican values are then communicated 
to the foreigner and the relevant consular or diplomatic office in the country of origin. If the 
results are deemed insufficient, the foreigner would, according to Art. R. 311-30-4 of the 
CESEDA, “benefit from training in relation to the field or fields in which the insufficiency has 
been found”. This training would be organised by the OFII or a ‘delegated actor’ (l'organisme 
délégataire). The training would start no later than two months after the official notification of the 
evaluation results and cannot exceed two months. The training regarding the values of the 
Republic would last for a minimum of half a day (Art. R. 311-30-5). 
The foreigner would be then subject to a second evaluation similar to that which was conducted in 
very first instance as provided in Art. 311-11-2 of the CESEDA. After the training takes place, the 
OFII or the delegated actor will deliver a certificate of course attendance. This document is 
official proof of attendance. A copy will be transmitted to the consular or diplomatic authorities 
for consideration when handling the visa application (Art. R. 311-30-7). In a departure from the 
cases of the Netherlands and Denmark, the law does not expressly specify the extent to which 
unjustifiable absence from the training might negatively affect the decision by the consular 
authorities to grant a visa – which adds to the already high level of discretion held by authorities 
abroad when deciding on visa applications. There are indeed very few formal references implying 
any kind of obligation or compulsory aspects in this process. It is nonetheless worth underlining 
that Art. 411-8 explicitly provides that the grant of the visa, and hence family reunification, is 
subject to the presentation of a certificate of attendance at the training or integration course. 
Therefore, in our view it is clear that the certificate of attendance will actually become another 
indirect condition for obtaining the visa.  
As stated above, Germany does not require any civic knowledge from potential migrants while 
abroad, although the passing of a language test at level A1 of the Common European 
Framework of Reference (CEFR) represents a requirement for spousal reunification.
74 
Table 2 gives an overview of the fees related to integration abroad requirements in the countries 
studied. 
 
                                                      
73 Arrêté relatif à l'évaluation dans leur pays de résidence du niveau de connaissance, par les étrangers, 
de la langue française et des valeurs de la République et aux formations prescrites dans ces domaines 
conformément aux articles R. 311-30-1 à R. 311-30-11 du code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et 
du droit d'asile, NOR: IMIC0827547A, Version consolidée au 28 mars 2009. 
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Table 2. Financial costs of integration abroad 
Country Costs 
Denmark  Covered by the applicant 
France  Covered by the state 
Germany  Covered by the applicant, depending on the country of origin; the fee for the test 
is €40-80; the fee for a (voluntary) preparatory course is around €600  
The Netherlands  €350 covered by the applicant 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
4.1.3 Personal  scope 
This section covers the personal scope of civic integration measures abroad and the extent to 
which national immigration laws cover all foreign nationalities equally or whether the laws 
envisage exemptions and if so, what kinds.  
The integration abroad test in the Netherlands must be passed by foreign citizens between the 
ages of 16 and 65 who are planning to apply for permanent residence. This means that migrants 
entering for temporary purposes, such as study, au pair jobs or medical treatment, will not have 
to comply with the integration abroad requirement. Moreover, the test applies exclusively to 
those persons who 1) require a provisional residence permit (MVV) to enter the Netherlands and 
2) are obliged to comply with integration conditions pursuant to the Integration Act (Wet 
inburgering) after arrival.
75 Thus, citizens of several developed countries, from whom an 
authorisation for temporary stay is not required, are exempt from the integration test. Apart from 
EU/EEA nationals, this includes migrants from Switzerland, the US, Canada, Japan, South 
Korea, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Australia and New Zealand. According to the explanatory 
memorandum to the Integration Abroad Act, this distinction on grounds of nationality is 
justified on the basis that countries whose citizens are exempt have a comparable level of 
economic, social and political development to EU countries.
76 Therefore, the argument goes, 
with respect to their admission there is no risk of an inflow of migrants that will result in 
problems for integration or social cohesion. Even so, it has also been argued that the tests 
discriminate indirectly based on ethnic origin, as they apply only to migrants from certain non-
Western countries.
77 Surinamese nationals who can submit written proof of having followed at 
least lower secondary education in the Dutch language in Suriname or in the Netherlands are 
also free from the integration test. Further exemptions apply to persons with a work permit, self-
employed persons, knowledge migrants (kennismigranten) and family members of persons with 
an asylum residence permit.
78 
In  Denmark, the pre-entry integration requirement will apply in principle to any foreigner 
seeking a residence permit for family reunification or as a religious preacher.
79 In respect of 
family migrants, exemptions to this rule can be made in special cases. According to the 
                                                      
75 Art. 16(1)(h) Vreemdelingenwet jo. Arts. 3 and 5 Wet inburgering. 
76 Memorie van Toelichting bij de Wet inburgering in het buitenland, Kamerstukken II, 2003–2004, 29 
700, No. 3, p. 19. 
77 Human Rights Watch has argued that the integration test abroad is apparently directed at potential 
family migrants of Moroccan and Turkish origin, which are the two largest immigrant groups in the 
Netherlands; see Human Rights’ Watch (2008), op. cit.  
78 Art. 17(1) Vreemdelingenwet. 
79 Lovforslag nr. L 93 om lov om ændring af udlændingeloven og lov om aktiv socialpolitik, pp. 8–9. 20 | CARRERA & WIESBROCK 
 
explanatory memorandum to the bill introducing the immigration test, such special grounds 
include cases where the family member already living in Denmark cannot be expected to join 
the applicant in another country because of a persisting risk of persecution or a serious illness. 
An exemption from the general requirement of passing the immigration test will always be 
made if this is required on the basis of Denmark’s international obligations, in particular Art. 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). There are no possibilities of derogation 
from the immigration test when granting a residence permit to religious preachers.  
In accordance with Law 2007-1631 and Decree 2008-1115 in France, certain categories of 
persons are exempt from civic integration abroad. First are those providing evidence of having 
followed a minimum of three years of secondary studies in a French school abroad or in a 
francophone educational establishment. Second are those having followed a minimum of one year 
of superior studies in France. Third are those who, for reasons of public order, a state of war or a 
natural or technological disaster, the training would entail serious difficulties, displacement or 
endanger the security of the foreigner, or those for whom following the training involves 
constraints that are incompatible with their physical or financial capacities, or their professional 
obligations (Art. 311-30-10 of the CESEDA). No further exemptions are included. 
Even though the German pre-entry test does not contain a civic element, it is interesting to note 
that the exemptions and their justifications under German law are very similar to those applied 
in the Netherlands. The categories of persons exempt from taking the pre-entry language test 
include highly qualified workers
80 and those who are not required to obtain a visa in order to 
enter Germany on the grounds of their nationality:
81 citizens of the EU/EEA, Switzerland, 
Australia, Israel, Japan, Canada, South Korea, New Zealand, the US, Andorra, Honduras, 
Monaco and San Marino.
82 If the sponsor holds one of the requisite nationalities, this exemption 
applies irrespective of the nationality of the incoming spouse. According to the German 
government, the difference in treatment on the grounds of nationality is justified, as it is in the 
particular interest of Germany to encourage the immigration of nationals from these countries.
83 
This argument has been supported by the Administrative Court of Berlin in a case of December 
2007, where it was concluded that the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Art. 3(1) of the 
German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) is not infringed if citizens of selected countries enjoy an 
exemption from the language requirement.
84 To identify a violation of Art. 3(1) GG, it must be 
concluded that there are no reasonable grounds related to the nature or the facts of the case that 
could justify the difference in treatment.
85 The privileged treatment of some nationals is 
considered permissible in view of commitments arising out of bilateral agreements and the 
protection of public interests. In the Court’s view, the Basic Law allows for a privileged 
treatment of nationals of certain countries, even if such a difference in treatment does not appear 
from the assessment of individual applications.
86 
                                                      
80 Section 30(1), second sentence, No. 1 jo. 19 AufenthG. 
81 Section 30(1), third sentence, No. 4 AufenthG. 
82 Sections 41(1) and 41(2) AufenthV.  
83 Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Sevim Dagdelen, Ulla Jelpke, 
Karin Binder, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE – Drucksache 16/5201 „Geplante 
Regelungen zum Familiennachzug“, Bundestag Drucksache 16/5498, Berlin, p. 6. 
84 Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, judgment of 19 December 2007, VG 5 V, 22.07. 
85 See also Bundesverfassungsgericht, judgment of 24 September 2007, 2 BvR 1673/03, ZBR 2007, p. 
416. 
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4.2  The internal dimension of civic integration 
The four EU member states under analysis present different ‘internal’ versions of the civic 
integration applicable to newcomers as well as those TCNs applying for long-term residence 
status and family reunification. It is here where the function of integration as a derogative clause 
for having access to security of residence (protection from expulsion) and social solidarity 
becomes more stringent and critical. We follow a similar structure of analysis as that used in 
section 4.1 when addressing civic integration in the host country.  
4.2.1 Purpose 
France has framed civic integration as a contractual obligation on the part of TCNs. The so-
called ‘welcome and integration contract’ (contrat d’accueil et d’intégration, CAI)
  seeks to 
institutionalise and formalise the contractual rationale in relation to the integration of TCNs to 
enable them to gain access to security of residence.
87 The contract used to be of a facultative 
nature,
88 but with the entry into force of the Sarkozy Law II of 24 July 2006 (Loi relative à 
l’immigration et à l’intégration, No. 2006-911),
89 it became mandatory.
90 According to the 
explanatory memorandum for the Project de loi (No. 2986), which was presented in April 2006, 
one of the main purposes behind the introduction of the conditionality of integration was to 
reinforce the route towards ‘intégration républicaine’ and to better evaluate three main elements 
of an immigrant’s integration. More specifically, these are the personal commitment of foreigners 
to French republican principles, the effective respect for these principles and sufficient knowledge 
of the French language. Integration is not judged solely on the basis of knowledge but on grounds 
of a stronger involvement of the foreigner:  
l'engagement personnel de l'étranger à respecter les principes qui régissent la 
République française, le respect effectif de ces principes et la connaissance suffisante de 
la langue française. L'intégration ne sera plus uniquement jugée sur des connaissances, 
mais sur une implication plus forte de l'étranger. (Emphasis added.) 
It was determined that the permanent settlement of TCNs in the country should be reserved for 
those who have chosen to respect “French values”.
91 Similar to the strategy used by the French 
government in relation to civic integration abroad for family reunification, and following the 
same position taken by the Dutch government, the conditional (obligatory) nature of the CAI 
was introduced when transposing Directive 2003/109/EC into the French legal system.
92 
                                                      
87 S. Carrera, A Comparison of Integration Programmes in the EU: Trends and Weaknesses, CHALLENGE 
Research Paper No. 1, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2006. 
88  Loi relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, au sejour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité, 
novembre 2003. 
89 See JORF, No. 170, 25 July 2006, p. 11047. The law was presented before the Conseil Constitutionnel, 
which only presented one reservation to Art. 45 of the law, and which declared the rest of the provisions in 
conformity with the Constitution. See Conseil Constitutionnel, 20 juillet 2006, No. 2006-539 DC, J.O. 25 
juillet 2006, p. 11066. See also N. Guimezanes, “Loi de 24 juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et à 
l’intégration”, La Semaine Juridique – Édition Générale, No. 36, 6 September 2006, pp. 1623–1624. 
90 See Uni(e)s contre une immigration jetable, « Analyse du projet de loi modifiant le code de l’entrée et du 
sejour des Étrangers et du droit d’asile » (CESEDA), Uni(e) contre une immigration jetable, Paris, 11 April 
2006 (retrieved from http://www.contreimmigrationjetable.org). 
91 This was stated in the report (No. 3058) by Thierry Mariani (député) of 26 April 2006: “De plus, 
l'installation durable en France doit être réservée à ceux qui ont choisi de respecter les valeurs de notre 
pays et d'en apprendre la langue” (retrieved from http://www.senat.fr/dossierleg/pjl05-362.html). 
92 See Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents, OJ L 16/44, 23.1.2004; see also Chapter V of the law, entitled Dispositions 22 | CARRERA & WIESBROCK 
 
In Denmark, immigrants also have to conclude an individual integration contract with the 
responsible local authorities within their first months of residence in the country.
93 The law 
introducing the obligation to conclude an integration contract entered into force on 1 July 
2002.
94 Previously, immigrants were covered by an individual ‘action plan’, which was rather 
similar to the current contract. The contract clearly specifies the rights and obligations of the 
person concerned, typically including the obligation to participate in language classes and other 
integration measures and to become economically self-sufficient as soon as possible.
95 The 
signature of such an integration contract is not just a formal commitment – compliance will be 
closely supervised by the responsible municipality, with a follow-up taking place every three 
months. Even though signature of the integration contract is not mandatory, refusal will delay 
the acquisition of a permanent residence permit. The integration contract expires the moment at 
which a permanent residence permit is acquired (usually after seven years). In addition to the 
integration contract, immigrants are obliged to sign a declaration of integration, attesting to their 
willingness to participate actively in all activities offered within the context of the integration 
programme. The official objectives of the Danish integration programme as stated in Section 1 
of the Danish Integration Act are the participation of newcomers in all areas of Danish society, a 
rapid process of becoming economically self-sufficient and a sound understanding of the 
fundamental values and norms of Danish society. Similar to the French case, the official goal is 
to ensure that only those meeting the civic integration criteria will have access to a residence 
permit and legal settlement in the country. It is arguable that the implicit objective is to reduce 
the number of immigrants who will be able to meet the integration (civic) threshold and will 
therefore have access to residence permits and security of residence.  
The purported official objectives for the application of an integration test in the Netherlands 
have been the acquisition by foreigners residing permanently in the Netherlands of sufficient 
knowledge of the Dutch language and society to enable them to participate in society.
96 The 
Integration Act (Wet inburgering) that entered into force on 1 January 2007
97 has the additional 
purpose of increasing the speed and effectiveness of the integration process. The civic 
integration regulations that previously applied were considered to have failed in this respect, 
falling short of the desired integration results.
98 Consequently, the government adopted a new 
                                                                                                                                                            
relatives aux étrangers bénéficiant du statut de résident de longue durée au sein de l’Union européenne, 
which establishes the provision implementing this Directive between Arts. 24 and 29. Refer also to GISTI, 
Le guide de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers en France, Paris: La Découverte, 2008, pp. 95–105. 
93 See Art. 3 of the Executive Order on individual contracts and introduction programmes in the 
Integration Act. 
94 Lov om ændring af integrationsloven (Individuelle kontrakter) nr. 364 of 6 June 2002. 
95 Details on the drafting of the contract are regulated in the decree on the preparation of individual 
contracts and the introduction programme (Bekendtgørelse om udarbejdelse af individuel kontrakt og om 
introduktionsprogrammet efter integrationsloven). 
96 See Memorie van toelichting bij het wetsvoorstel Wet inburgering, Kamerstukken II, 2005–2006, 30 
308; see also Adviescommissie voor vreemdelingenzaken (ACVZ), De Contourennota getoets; juridische 
mogelijkheden tot een meer verplichtend inburgeringsstelsel, ACVZ, Den Haag, 2004.  
97 Wet van 30 november 2006, houdende regels inzaken inburgering in de Nederlandse samenleving (Wet 
inburgering). 
98 See Tijdelijke Commissie Integratiebeleid, Eindrapport: Bruggen Bouwen, Kamerstukken II 2003–04, 
28 689, nrs. 8-9, p. 524. The Committee concluded that the results of the integration courses were 
disappointing. It considered that the lessons offered where not sufficiently adapted to each applicant and 
that only a few newcomers managed passed to a higher level within the 600 lessons provided. The 
committee stressed that the desired level of language proficiency to be achieved actually varied from case 
to case, and suggested the need to adopt more realistic expectations. CIVIC INTEGRATION OF THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS | 23 
 
integration policy that has a larger target group (also including ‘old-comers’ (oudkomers)), 
which is focused on results rather than participation and emphasises individual responsibility.
99 
The Dutch legislator referred, inter alia, to the EU’s CBPs on integration and the explicit 
possibility granted to member states in Directives 2003/86/EC and 2003/109/EC to impose 
integration conditions upon TCNs to justify the application of an integration test.
100 Even 
though there is no explicit ‘contractual’ obligation required from migrants in the integration 
process of newcomers, the latter will be closely supervised by the responsible municipality. 
Starting with an intake interview directly upon arrival and successive progress checks, the 
municipality will continually evaluate the extent to which the migrant has complied with his/her 
integration requirements.  
As regards the official purpose of the German  orientation course, Section 43(3) of the 
Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) refers to the acquisition of knowledge of the legal order, the 
culture and the history of Germany.
101 The Ordinance on Integration Courses 
(Integrationskursverordnung) contains in Section 3(1) a more precise definition of these areas 
of knowledge, referring in particular to the principles of the rule of law, equal treatment, 
tolerance and religious freedom. According to Section 3 of the Ordinance, the content of the 
orientation course illustrates that integration goes beyond the mere acquisition of language 
proficiency. Along these lines, the overall objectives of the orientation course, as formulated in 
the concept paper for a federal integration course (Konzept für einen bundesweiten 
Integrationskurs), are the acquisition of an understanding of the German state system (including 
principles such as federalism, the welfare state and the party system). The objectives also entail 
the development of a positive attitude towards and identification with the German state, 
knowledge of the rights and duties as residents and citizens, the development of the ability to 
acquire information independently, participation in social life and the acquisition of intercultural 
competences (the ability to operate in a foreign cultural context).
102 
4.2.2  Material scope  
Compliance with the integration requirements in Denmark is a precondition for the acquisition 
of a permanent residence permit pursuant to Section 11(9) of the Aliens Act (Udlændingeloven). 
The so-called ‘integration examination’ to be passed in order to obtain a permanent residence 
permit consists of a Danish language test at level 2 (level B1 CEFR) or level 1 (level A2 CEFR) 
together with an English language test at level 2 (level B1 CEFR) and the requirement to have 
been in full-time employment in Denmark for at least two and a half years.
103 A particularly 
successful integration process may lead to obtaining a permanent residence permit in less time 
than is usually the case (after five instead of seven years). This opportunity appears in Section 
11(4)  Udlændingeloven, which provides for the possibility to grant a permanent residence 
permit after five years to foreigners who have been continuously employed for at least three 
years, have not relied on Danish social assistance and have established a “meaningful 
connection to Danish society” (væsentlig tilknytning til det danske samfund).  
                                                      
99 Memorie van toelichting bij het wetsvoorstel Wet inburgering, Kamerstukken II, 2005–2006, 30 308. 
100 Ibid. 
101 It needs to be underlined that the rules on integration have been introduced together with rules 
concerning the regulation and limitation of immigration (official title of the law: Gesetz zur Steuerung 
und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von 
Unionsbürgern und Ausländern).  
102 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2009), Konzept für einen bundesweiten Integrationskurs. 
Überarbeitete Neuauflage, pp. 24–25. 
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Within the Danish introduction programme, the civic element of integration is built into the 
linguistic element. Hence, there is no separate, civic educational programme or civic integration 
test. The language courses comprise intensive language tuition as well as the provision of 
information on Danish culture and society. In addition, the Danish introduction programme 
contains integration measures related to the labour market, such as traineeships with private or 
public employers.
104 Danish language courses are conducted at three levels, depending on the 
educational background of the participant. Each course is finalised with a test at the specific 
level pursued.
105 Throughout each of the courses, information on Danish society, especially on 
the Danish labour market, education system and democratic principles are provided. Indeed, in 
contrast to the other three EU member states under analysis, a specific feature of the Danish 
introduction programme is its focus on labour market and social integration. Immigrants are to 
participate in so-called ‘activation measures’, ranging from counselling and educational 
activities with a labour market focus to traineeships and wage supplement programmes.
106 
The application of the CAI in France means that the grant of legal residency and the right of 
permanent residence will be subject to fulfilment of the ‘republican conditions’ of integration 
and the requirements outlined in the contract. Yet, no formal civic integration test is being 
applied. Arts. L. 311-9 and 314-2 of the CESEDA establish that the grant of the first residence 
permit (carte de resident) is contingent on the TCN’s fulfilment of the republican aspects of 
integration into French society. The degree of integration will be evaluated taking into account the 
commitment of the individual to respect the principles governing the French Republic and to 
acquire French language skills. Art. L. 314-2 further stipulates that in this regard the competent 
public authority will need to consider the commitment of the applicant to the CAI itself (as 
provided in Art. L. 311-19 of the code) and the favourable opinion of the mayor in the TCN’s 
place of residence (maire de la commune de residence). 
The OFII is now in charge of monitoring the performance of the CAI. Decree No. 2006-1791 of 
23 December 2006 fine-tuned and developed the features, objectives, procedures and scope of the 
CAI, as well as the precise functions of the OFII in this context.
107 The latter presents the contract 
to the TCN in a language that s/he understands during the course of a personal interview (entretien 
individuel), in which the contract is to be signed. The duration of the CAI is one year, which is a 
substantially shorter period than the Danish contract. The interview will also serve to determine 
the TCN’s French language skills through use of a multiple-choice exam.
108 The Arrêté of 19 
January 2007 has specified the official model for this multiple-choice exam and the ways in which 
the capacities of oral and written expression and comprehension are to be evaluated.
109  
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In addition to the language dimension,
110 the CAI foresees a civic training course and an 
informative session about ‘life in France’. The civic training, as provided in Art. L. 311-9 of the 
code and according to Art. R. 311-22 of Decree No. 2006-1791, will specifically entail the 
presentation of the French institutions and the values of the Republic. Again, these topics mainly 
refer to equality between men and women, secularism, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and 
the safety of individuals and goods, as well as the exercise of citizenship, which includes 
mandatory and free access to education. The total duration of this training will be six hours.
111 
Participation in this course will be validated with a certificate of regular attendance granted by the 
OFII.
112 The session concerning life in France, as stipulated in Art. R. 311-25 of the Decree, aims 
at providing the signatory of the CAI ‘sufficient knowledge’ about practical life in France. It 
incorporates information about access to public authorities and relevant services, which mainly 
include training, employment, housing, health, education and minor policies, as well as 
community life. The session will last a minimum of one hour and a maximum of six hours.
113 
Attendance will also be validated by the OFII with a certificate (attestation d’assiduité). 
The CAI will end on the month following the finalisation of the compulsory period of training, 
regardless of the successful or negative nature of the validation, or at the latest one day after the 
exam leading to the presentation of the diploma.
114 Art. R. 311-28 of Decree No. 2006-1791 
provides that the contract may be declared terminated by the prefect of the TCN’s place of 
residence, following the advice of the OFII, if there is evidence of non-attendance or non-
compliance with the contractual obligations and there is no legitimate reason exempting the 
person from them. The prefect will inform the TCN of the termination and its negative 
consequences on granting or renewing the residence permit (carte de séjour) as provided in Art. L. 
311-9 of the CESEDA. The prefect will also communicate the evaluation results related to the 
republican conditions of integration that are stipulated in Art. L. 314-2 of the same code. At the 
end of the contract, the OFII will verify whether the TCN has complied with all the obligations 
included in the CAI; the obligations will be considered fulfilled if the TCN has been granted all 
the above-mentioned certificates.  
The OFII will then issue a certificate recapitulating compliance with the provisions of the CAI and 
the ways in which they have been evaluated and graded. This certificate (attestation) will be sent 
to the prefect of the TCN’s place of residence. Failure to integrate into French society, understood 
as a violation by the TCN of the obligations of the CAI, will justify the application of sanctions by 
the state, which will in turn lead to an insecure residence status for the TCN. The sanctions may 
entail the latter not being granted a permanent residence permit or a negative decision regarding 
the renewal of the temporary administrative status of stay and hence expulsion from the country. 
Law 2007-1631 also invented another version of the welcome and integration contract, this time 
related to the official conception of republican integration of the family into French society 
(Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration pour la famille, CAIF). The new Art. 311-9-1 of the CESEDA 
compels TCNs holding a permanent residence permit and their family members benefiting from 
family reunification (and “if one or more children have benefited from the family reunification 
procedure”) to conclude a contract with the French state, obliging them to follow a course on “the 
rights and duties of parents in France” and to ensure the proper schooling of their children. Decree 
No. 2008-1115 stipulates that the training will last for a minimum of one day, organised and 
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financed by the OFII. Art. R. 311-10-14 of the CESEDA states that the training focuses 
especially on parental authority, equality between men and women, child protection and the 
principles governing their schooling in France. In cases where the contractual conditions are not 
respected either by the TCN or her/his spouse, the measure foreseen in Art. 222-4-1 of the relevant 
code (code de l’action sociale et de familles) consists of a financial sanction through the cessation 
of family social benefits (allocations familiales) granted by the French state and eventually 
administrative sanctions – refusal to renew the carte de séjour or grant the carte de resident, and 
hence eventual expulsion from the country.  
Le Haut Conseil à l’intégration (HCI) issued an opinion entitled “Making known the values and 
symbols of the Republic and organizing the modalities of evaluating their knowledge” (Faire 
Connaitre Les Valeurs et Symboles de la République et organiser les modalités d’évaluation de 
leur connaissance) in April 2009, in response to a request by Brice Hortefeux (head of the 
ministry of immigration, integration, national identity and development). The request concerned 
the modalities for implementing and evaluating the civic elements of integration (knowledge of 
shared values and symbols of the Republic) of foreigners who wish to settle in France and the 
exact content of these elements, as well as the conditions under which the national anthem could 
be better known and understood by ‘migrants’. It should be highlighted that the HCI has been a 
key actor in supporting the idea of the contract and the mandatory nature of civic integration. In a 
report of 2004, the HCI sustained the need to couple the CAI with a “component of civic 
education” (volet de formation civique). Indeed, as Lochak (2006) has also underlined,
115 the HCI 
has played an important role in building the neo-republican French ‘model’ of integration, 
according to which the Republic performs an integrationist function by its own nature, and 
reciprocally, integration cannot be anything but republican. It is in this particular context that we 
need to understand the 2009 opinion.  
The HCI report calls for and legitimises the need for TCNs not only ‘to know’, but also to 
understand, respect and adhere
116 to what it refers to as “our common civic heritage” (notre 
patrimoine civique commun). This patrimony comprises, the report argues, the following 
republican symbols and values: Marianne, La Marseillaise, the three-colour flag, the republican 
ideals of liberté, egalité, fraternité et laïcité, the national holiday of 14 July and the Universal 
Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen of 1789 (which became the Preamble of 
the French Constitution). Among the full range of policy recommendations put forward by the 
report, we highlight two. First is the further strengthening of values and symbols in the civic 
integration training under the CAI, through the creation of a specific module dealing exclusively 
with them in addition to two other modules that would respectively cover history and institutions. 
Second is the use of a civic training film or documentary about republican values and the way of 
life in France, especially in the external dimension of integration, but also in the CAI training 
(reminiscent of the films used first by the Netherlands and Denmark). 
In Germany, the acquisition of a permanent right of residence also depends on the fulfilment of 
an integration requirement. It is a precondition for the acquisition of a settlement permit under 
Section 9(2) Aufenthaltsgesetz  that the applicant conveys basic knowledge of the legal and 
social order and living conditions in the Federal Republic. This requirement can only be 
fulfilled by successfully completing an integration course, unless one of the exemptions applies. 
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In addition, ordinary participation in integration courses is one of the considerations to be taken 
into account when prolonging a temporary residence permit. According to Section 8(3) 
Aufenthaltsgesetz, repetitive and clear violation of the obligation to participate in integration 
courses can lead to a refusal to extend the temporary residence permit of a foreigner who does 
not have a right to acquire a residence permit. Where the right to extend the residence permit 
does exist, refusal is still possible unless the foreigner can submit proof that his/her integration 
into society and social life has occurred by other means. If this provision is applied, in line with 
Art. 8 of the ECHR, the foreigner’s period of legal residence, his/her ties with Germany and the 
consequences of a termination of residence for legally resident family members of the foreigner 
must be taken into account. 
Concerning the structure of the integration programme, it starts with a German language 
proficiency test for immigrants (Deutsch für Zugewanderte: Einstufungstest), to assign 
newcomers to their suitable level of language instruction. Persons who already convey sufficient 
language skills will automatically proceed to take the German language examination (Zertifikat 
Deutsch) at level B1, followed by the civic element of the integration programme. All other 
immigrants are required to follow a basic language course or a follow-up course until they reach 
the required level of language proficiency. 
Subsequently, all persons falling under the obligation to integrate must participate in a civic 
orientation course (Orientierungskurs) of 45 hours. The content of the orientation course builds 
upon the objectives of the acquisition of knowledge about the German legal system, history and 
culture, including the principles of the rule of law, equal treatment, tolerance and religious 
freedom. The curriculum for a uniform federal orientation course was developed in 2007.
117 It 
forms a legally binding foundation for federal orientation courses, which have been in place 
since 1 January 2008. The curriculum specifies the content and learning objectives, and forms 
the basis for the standardised test that must be passed after completion of the course.
118 The 
following subjects are dealt with in the integration course: politics in a democracy (module 1, 
covering the fundamental principles of the German state, rights and duties of citizens, the party 
system, etc.); history and responsibility (module 2 on Nazi Germany, the country’s post-war 
history, German reunification and the EU); and people and society (module 3 on the German 
education system, religious diversity and intercultural communication, etc.).
119 
Section 13 of the Ordinance on integration courses  envisages the provision of specialised 
orientation courses for specific target groups. In terms of content, young migrants under the age 
of 27 are to follow the general mandatory curriculum, as they have to pass the standardised 
integration test at the end of the orientation course. The same applies to orientation courses 
targeted at women and parents. At the same time, the teaching material and methods may be 
selected with a particular view of the interests of the specific target group. The uniform 
curriculum is not binding with respect to participants in a so-called ‘Alpha-Orientierungskurs’, 
which is offered to persons with an insufficient ability to read or write.
120 
A uniform, standardised test for evaluating the civic knowledge of foreigners was introduced in 
January 2009.
121 The test consists of 25 multiple-choice questions, 13 of which have to be 
answered correctly. The 25 questions are derived from a catalogue of 250 questions based on 
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the three modules of the curriculum of the orientation course.
122 Successful participants of both 
the language test at level B1 and the test following the orientation course are provided with an 
integration course certificate (Zertifikat Integrationskurs).
123 The civic orientation test can also 
be taken without following the courses by applicants for settlement permits, and it will serve as 
proof of having the required level of civic knowledge. 
Pursuant to Art. 21(1)(k) Vreemdelingenwet,  foreigners wishing to acquire a permanent 
residence permit in the Netherlands must have passed an integration exam 
(inburgeringsexamen). In January 2007, the obligation for foreigners to participate in a language 
course and an orientation course (maatschapij orientatie) was abandoned, giving way to a 
requirement to acquire Dutch language skills and knowledge Dutch society by individual 
study.
124 Failure to pass the test will lead to the refusal to grant a residence permit. At the same 
time, the holding of a temporary residence permit is restricted to a period of five years at 
most.
125 This means that a TCN’s unwillingness or inability to comply with the integration 
requirement will inevitably lead to his/her expulsion from the Netherlands. The civic element of 
this obligation to integrate requires immigrants to acquire knowledge on Dutch society, in 
particular on the following topics: work and income, behaviour, values and norms, living, health 
and health care, history and geography, administration, the state and the rule of law and 
education.
126 According to Art. 7(1) Wet inburgering, an integration test has to be passed within 
three and a half years by persons who have passed the integration exam abroad based on Art. 16 
Vreemdelingenwet and within five years in all other cases where a duty to integrate exists (see 
below). The test consists of a central part and a practise part.
127  
The central part contains three components, namely an electronic practise test, a Dutch oral 
language test and test for knowledge about Dutch society.
128 The electronic practise component 
and the knowledge component embody the civic nature of the central part of the integration test. 
The test is taken in the form of an interview with a computer, which asks the candidate 
questions on Dutch society and gives him/her assignments to complete. Most electronic practise 
tests consist of 43 questions (or less) in a period of 60 minutes, 73% of which must be answered 
correctly. The second civic component of the integration test, the test on knowledge of Dutch 
society (examen Kennis van de Nederlandse samenleving) is also conducted by a computer. 
During a period of 45 minutes, applicants are shown a number of short films. They must 
subsequently answer 62% of around 43 questions correctly to pass.  
In the second part of the integration exam, the practise test, immigrants are examined on a 
number of practical situations they might encounter in the Netherlands.
129 The practise test 
contains a linguistic as well as a civic element, as language proficiency and the ability to get by 
in everyday life in the Netherlands are tested simultaneously. Assessment takes place through a 
practise test, the submission of a portfolio or a combination of both.
130 The test involves six 
different role plays, during which the applicant must show that s/he can deal with all sorts of 
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practical situations related to working life, health care or education. Alternatively, a portfolio 
can be submitted, containing at least 30 documents that prove the applicant’s ability to cope 
with daily life in the Netherlands, such as a letter of application or a document demonstrating 
that the person had a conversation with his/her child’s schoolteacher.  
The overall costs for the test amount to €230, i.e. €126 for the central part plus €104 for the 
practise part.
131 Successfully passing all parts of the test will be certified with a diploma.
132 It is 
notable that the civic knowledge test and the language test are conducted at the same level as the 
previous citizenship test and that the diploma obtained serves as proof of being integrated for 
naturalisation. This means that the level of integration that is required by immigrants after three 
and a half years of residence in the Netherlands is the same as that demanded of potential 
citizens. It illustrates the extent to which foreigners are already expected to have become 
‘Dutch’ within a relatively short period of time. 
4.2.3 Personal  scope 
The Danish Integration Act (Integrationsloven) and a corresponding obligation to participate in 
integration measures applies to all aliens (refugees and immigrants) of 18 years or more who are 
lawfully residing in Denmark.
133 Citizens of other Nordic countries as well as EU/EEA 
nationals and their family members fall outside the scope of the Act.
134 Apart from them, an 
exemption applies to immigrants and refugees who have already been resident in Denmark prior 
to 1 January 1999. The Act on Danish courses for adult aliens and others (Lov om 
danskuddannelse til voksne udlændinge) confers a right to be offered Danish courses by the 
municipality where they are registered to all adult aliens legally residing in Denmark and minor 
aliens in case it is considered unreasonable or impossible for them to make use of other relevant 
offers of education.
135 Thus, whereas the mandatory civic integration condition applies 
exclusively to TCNs, EU/EEA citizens also have the right to participate in Danish language 
instruction.  
In France, the following categories of persons are exempt from signing the CAI according to Art. 
L. 311-9 of the CESEDA:  
i)  those foreigners providing evidence of having followed a minimum of three years of 
secondary studies in a French school abroad or in a francophone educational establishment;  
ii)  those having followed a minimum of a year of superior studies in France (Art. R. 311-19);  
iii)  those holding residence permits (as well as their family members and children older than 
16) who fall into the category of intra-corporate transferees (Art. L. 313-10 of the 
CESEDA);  
iv)  those holding a residence permit mentioning competences and skills (La carte de séjour 
portant la mention compétences et talents) as stipulated by Art. L. 315-1; and  
v)  foreigners between the ages of 16 and 18 who meet the conditions for the acquisition of 
French nationality foreseen in Art. 21-7 of the civil code (Art. L. 314-12 of the CESEDA). 
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Participation in integration courses in Germany is mandatory for all newly arriving immigrants 
who are permanently residing in Germany
136 based on a residence permit or a settlement permit 
and who are not able to communicate in the German language at a basic level.
137 In addition, 
resident foreigners who receive ‘unemployment benefit II’ or have ‘special integration needs’ 
are obliged to follow an integration course.
138 Participation is open on a voluntary basis 
(provided there are enough places for other resident TCNs) to EU citizens and German nationals 
in special need of integration.
139 The ‘entitlement’ (Anspruch) to participate in integration 
courses does not apply to children, juveniles or young adults who are taking up or continuing 
their school education in Germany and foreigners who are evidently in little need of integration 
(geringer Integrationsbedarf). In addition, the following categories of foreigners are exempt 
from the obligation (Teilnahmeverpflichtung) of attending an integration course: those 
undergoing any form of education or vocational training in Germany; those who have attended 
comparable education courses in Germany; those for whom such continuous participation is 
considered unfeasible or unreasonable; and finally, long-term residents who have already 
attended integration courses in other member states.
140 
In  the Netherlands, the obligation to integrate (inburgeringsplichting) applies to legal 
foreigners in the sense of Arts. 8(a-e) or (l) Vreemdelingenwet  who are residing in the 
Netherlands for non-temporary purposes or who are religious preachers.
141 Thus, all non-
EU/EEA immigrants
142 between the ages of 18 and 65, whose purpose of stay is of a non-
temporary nature must pass an integration exam.
143 The requirement applies to both newcomers 
and oudkomers who were already living in the Netherlands at the point of entry into force of the 
Integration Act. Exemptions apply to several categories of foreigners. First, immigrants who 
have followed at least eight years of compulsory education in the Netherlands are presumed to 
have sufficient Dutch language skills.
144 Second, foreigners who are able to present special 
diplomas or certificates, proving that their knowledge of the Dutch language and society is 
already adequate are exempt.
145 Acceptable means of proof are secondary or higher educational 
diplomas obtained in the Netherlands, Belgium or Suriname as well as level A2 certificates 
from integration courses followed in accordance with the 1998 Wet inburgering nieuwkomers. 
Foreigners with prior knowledge of the Dutch language also have the possibility to take a short 
exemption test, consisting of the electronic practise test and the societal knowledge test 
conducted at a higher level of language proficiency (B1) than the regular test. Third, certain 
vulnerable groups are exempt from the integration requirement, including illiterates and persons 
suffering from a physical or mental illness who can demonstrate that they have made an effort to 
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learn Dutch and can prove based on an independent assessment that they will not be able to 
learn Dutch within the next five years.
146 The Integration Act also includes a broader exemption 
for persons who cannot be expected to pass the integration test owing to the country’s 
international human rights obligations.
147 
5.  Common deficits of national civic integration measures 
This section identifies common vulnerabilities stemming from the application of civic 
integration measures in the immigration laws of Denmark, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. The two main deficits affecting the internal and external dimensions of civic 
integration relate to the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination. 
5.1 Proportionality
148 
Proportionality has become one of the most important aspects of the general principles of EC 
law.
149 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has deemed this principle particularly appropriate 
when reviewing the legality of administrative actions adopted by EU member states in the scope 
of EC law. The proportionality test comprises a three-level evaluation: suitability, necessity and 
proportionality stricto sensu.
150 The sub-principle of necessity consists of the examination as to 
whether the measure is necessary to achieve the intended goal and the extent to which there are 
other less restrictive options (in other words, the search for the least onerous option) to achieve 
the same end. The sub-principle of proportionality stricto sensu looks at the extent to which the 
measure has imposed an excessive burden upon a recognised right when taking into account the 
public objective in view. The subjectivity, mandatory nature and intended public goals of civic 
integration measures in our four EU member states can be identified as the most crucial factors 
when evaluating their compatibility with the rule of law. 
5.1.1 Subjectivity 
A certain tension arises when looking at the inherently subjective nature of civic integration 
next to the principle of proportionality. Civic integration functions as an exception or a 
derogative clause for TCNs to have access to security of residence and rights as provided by 
national immigration legislation and at times EC immigration law. The indeterminate character 
of the civic dimension leaves too much discretion to the imagination of the national public 
authority or private actor conducting the evaluation of whether the applicant is integrated into 
the ‘national’ set of values and symbols or is ‘at the margins’ of the perceived national model. 
Some could argue that this subjectivity would be to some extent better justified in the context of 
nationality law and naturalisation procedures, where the end goal is citizenship. Yet, when 
moving to immigration legislation, and particularly those administrative features that have been 
subject to Europeanisation (see section 6 below), the disproportionate character of civic 
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integration conditions becomes a domestic mechanism endangering the legal certainty and 
foundations of the common EU immigration policy.  
After surveying the ways in which civic integration is tested and practised across the four EU 
member states, it remains difficult to ascertain the existence of any objective criteria or 
procedure that could be described as meeting the principle of legal certainty. National 
immigration law does not seem to provide a sufficiently clear and precise definition of ‘civic 
integration’ that is accessible to all persons concerned and which prevents illiberal interferences 
by state authorities or private actors when granting (temporary or permanent) residence permits 
or visas to TCNs. The principle of legal certainty requires that individuals know the legal 
consequences of their actions and that the quality of the law is as high and objective as possible 
to prevent exceptionalism by public authorities beyond any remits of legality.
151 The category of 
‘values’ is by definition vague and subject to divergent interpretations and ideologies. There is a 
presumption by the nation-state and certain officials, however, of the existence of a clear 
meaning of ‘national identity’ and a commonly shared understanding of what national values 
and symbols actually are and mean. Any attempt to provide a legal definition of what ‘national’ 
means (customs, traditions, ways of life, symbols, values, etc.) would lead to huge conflicts 
going beyond any migration-related debate, spreading across the entire citizenry. Such a 
definition would face the challenge of trying to meet ever-evolving social practices and 
incorporating a plurality of identities across the constructed nation, as well as different 
interpretations and visions of the scope and limits of nationalism. This civic integration dilemma 
becomes even more relevant in those EU member states presenting decentralised (or multi-
governance) domestic settings, where a plurality of identities and feelings of belonging have 
been institutionalised within their constitutional frameworks.  
Furthermore, what are the legal mechanisms and judicial guarantees provided in national 
immigration law for TCNs to mount a legal challenge against a decision rejecting family 
reunification on the basis that they are not civically integrated? The answer to this question is 
especially unclear in the context of integration abroad requirements, but the internal dimension 
of civic integration also raises similar concerns. The answer, however, has profound 
implications for the respect of the fundamental right to an effective remedy as enshrined in Art. 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
152  
Finally, across the national arenas we see a progressive privatisation of immigration control. As 
highlighted by Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera (2009), trust in the discretion of local officers 
has been progressively replaced by confidence in and reliance upon private actors that develop 
and administer integration tests and programmes, and promote ‘nationalism’ in the form of 
integration exams obliging TCNs to have knowledge (of the values and way of life) of the 
receiving society.
153 The possibility envisaged by some national laws for the involvement of 
private actors in the integration examination procedure (within the country or abroad) ever 
widens the scope for debate as regards the ways in which fundamental rights and the rule of law 
                                                      
151 Refer to Art. 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 303/01, 
14.12.2007. For a brief analysis of relevant ECJ case law on the principle of legal certainty, see P. Craig 
and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Fourth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007, pp. 551–558. 
152 See Craig and G. de Búrca (2007), pp. 551-558. On the right of TCNs to effective remedies in EU law, 
see E. Brouwer, Digital Borders and Real Rights: Effective Remedies for Third-Country Nationals in the 
Schengen Information System, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007. 
153 E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera, “Understanding the Contest of Community: Illiberal 
Practices in the EU?”, in E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: 
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principles are being met. Under which conditions are non-discrimination and ethical standards 
guaranteed when services and policies are provided by private actors?  
5.1.2 Mandatory  nature 
Another point of contention in light of the principle of proportionality relates to the mandatory 
nature of civic integration and the effects of non-compliance by the applicant (the sanctions). It 
is our view that national civic integration measures fail to pass the ‘less restrictive and onerous 
test’ and therefore can be viewed as unnecessary. In all the countries under consideration, pre-
entry integration tests and compliance with integration conditions or participation in state-
organised integration courses are obligatory. This, we have argued, is also the case in France even 
though at a first glance one could be erroneously inclined to think that integration abroad is 
‘facultative’ for the actual delivery of a visa. The degree of civic knowledge is also an issue of 
concern in this respect. TCNs are required to acquire a more comprehensive understanding of 
the receiving state’s institutions, history and values than many citizens in order to enter the 
country, have access to security of residence, and in the case of France, enjoy the fundamental 
right of respect for family life.
154 The proportionality of the civic integration test is highly 
questionable in the Netherlands, where the requirements to acquire a secure residence status are 
as high as those applied to future citizens.
155 In the case of Denmark and Germany, one might 
wonder whether the obligation to participate in time-consuming introduction programmes is the 
least restrictive (and most effective) means available to foster TCNs’ social integration.
156 
If the applicant fails to be civically integrated, national immigration laws foresee a set of 
(indirect and direct) sanctions. The failure to comply with the integration requirement can lead 
to the denial of a permanent residence status. In three of the four countries (not including 
Denmark, which as stated above has an opt-out on Title IV of the EC Treaty), TCNs who do not 
comply with national integration conditions will not be able to acquire an EC long-term 
residence permit in light of Directive 2003/109/EC. Furthermore, even though it is not always 
explicitly stated in national immigration law, non-compliance with integration conditions will in 
all four countries result in the expulsion of TCNs, as the holding of a temporary residence 
permit is generally limited to a certain period of time prior to the acquisition of a permanent 
residence permit. In Germany, an unsatisfactory integration process can in extreme cases even 
lead to a refusal to extend a temporary residence permit. A similar situation occurs in the 
Netherlands, where failure to pass the test will lead to a refusal to grant a residence permit and 
expulsion from the country. Along with residence-related sanctions, the legislation in all four 
countries envisages the application of fines in the event of non-compliance with the obligation 
to integrate. In the context of family reunion, the CAIF in France foresees that if the contractual 
obligations are not met, including those of a civic nature, the family will be penalised with a 
                                                      
154 As noted earlier, TCNs are obliged as a first step to show evidence of integration according to the 
concept of the perfect French citizen in order to have access to security of residence and long-term 
residence status (the CAI). As a second step, they will also need to show their absorption into the concept 
of ‘the perfect French republican family’ to enjoy the fundamental right to respect of family life and the 
EU rights linked to family reunification (the CAIF). Refer to Art. 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
155 G.R. de Groot, J. Kuipers and F. Weber, “Passing Citizenship Tests as a Requirement for 
Naturalization: A Comparative Perspective”, in E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera, Illiberal Liberal 
States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009. 
156 See for instance, T. Liebig, The labour market integration of immigrants in Denmark, OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 50, OECD, Paris, March 2007, which shows that the way 
in which the Danish integration programme has been conducted is too lengthy and extensive, something 
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financial sanction freezing access to family social benefits, the eventual refusal to renew the 
temporary residence permits and expulsion.  
5.1.3  The intended public goal 
Is civic integration necessary to achieve the intended public goal pursued by national 
immigration legislation? When looking at the political justifications put forward by most of the 
governments across the EU member states analysed in this paper, it is clear that one of the main 
intended public goals behind its use is better management of migration and diversity. Civic 
integration functions as an instrument for migration control, as a selection mechanism for the 
kinds of immigrants who will be allowed to enter and reside in the state. As shown in section 4.1.1 
above, the general purpose of civic integration abroad has been a reduction in the number of 
entries (through legal channels) for the purposes of family reunification. The introduction of a 
requirement to pass a civic integration exam has primarily aimed at reducing the number of 
residence permits granted for these very purposes. In Denmark, it is expected that the test will lead 
to a decrease in the number of applicants for family reunion. Integration abroad in France has 
already proved to be quite effective towards that goal and it appears that the application rates will 
fall even further. This is also evident when looking at the case of the Netherlands, where the 
integration test introduced by the Integration Abroad Act was later on thought of as too easy 
because of the high success rate of candidates passing the exam, which in turn led to increasing 
the degree of difficulty of the questions. Therefore, making family reunion more difficult, with the 
prospect that family migrants may delay or even cancel their intended settlement, appears to be the 
predominant intended public goal driving civic integration abroad. 
It is interesting to note that the arguments substantiating the legislative measures making use of 
civic integration have often alluded to practices already existing in other EU member states as 
well as to the obligation to transpose EC immigration law. For instance, in Denmark the 
proposal putting forward the integration test abroad expressly referred to the Dutch integration 
test as the model of inspiration. Similarly, the French government mentioned the Dutch 
integration policy before making the CAI mandatory and introducing integration abroad. 
Germany’s language requirement abroad also found a source of inspiration in the Netherlands. 
Here we refer back to the effects of the exchange of ideas among EU member states 
representatives taking place within the scope of the NCPs’ network in the EU Framework on 
Integration. The Dutch approach to integration has indeed become a model for other countries in 
the EU in the development of civic integration measures and programmes for TCNs.
157 What is 
more, the transposition of EC immigration law has often been instrumentalised by certain 
governments to pass new amendments in their national legislation making use of civic integration 
measures as a tool for a restrictive immigration policy. In France, for instance, the introduction of 
civic integration abroad and the obligatory nature of the CAI and the CAIF were justified in light 
of the transposition of Directives 2003/109/EC and 2003/86/EC.  
5.2 Non-Discrimination 
What is the target group of civic integration measures? Who is covered by civic integration? 
The examination of the personal scope purported by the internal and external dimensions of civic 
integration shows a highly diverse picture of the persons covered or exempt from taking the 
programmes, tests or contracts. There appears, however, to be a common presumption that certain 
categories of foreigners are already very well integrated or do not need to be integrated into the 
                                                      
157 Here we can refer also to the example of the UK. For a detailed study, see R. Van Oers, “Justifying 
Citizenship Tests in the Netherlands and the UK”, in E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (eds), 
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nation and its perceived values, symbols and way of life. This is most prominently the case for 
nationals of EU member states (EU citizens according to Art. 17 EC Treaty), who cannot be 
subject to any civic integration tests or measures as a condition for exercising their freedom to 
move and reside in another member state of the Union. There are additionally certain migrants 
who are not obliged to pass a civic integration evaluation on a completely different basis. For 
example, among the group of TCNs who are exempt from taking the CAI and the CAIF in 
France are those benefiting from the residence permit mentioning competences and skills (La 
carte de séjour portant la mention compétences et talents). These persons are thus considered 
‘highly skilled’ following the logic of a selective immigration approach (immigration choisie), 
which has driven French immigration policy during the last few years. In respect of pre-entry 
integration requirements, the same holds true for ‘knowledge migrants’ in the Netherlands and 
‘highly qualified migrants’ in Germany. Moreover, both countries provide an exemption from the 
integration abroad requirement for nationals of selected countries, who do need a visa/provisional 
residence permit to enter the country. Nationals from the US, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New 
Zealand, Monaco and Lichtenstein are held to be perfectly integrated into the values and symbols 
of the receiving country. Civic integration measures and conditions are not used when the nation-
state wants to encourage immigration from some countries by granting their nationals a privileged 
treatment for entry and residence or when attracting those labelled as ‘highly skilled 
immigrants’.
158 On the other hand, these exemptions implicitly provide further evidence for the 
argument that civic integration is primarily intended to make the immigration of certain 
immigrants more difficult. 
In 2008, Human Rights Watch published a report entitled, The Netherlands: Discrimination in 
the Name of Integration,
159 which dealt with the Dutch integration test abroad. The report 
argued that by providing a “blanket exemption” for some “Western” nationalities and not others, 
the test was disproportionate in its aims and nature, constituting a violation of Art. 14 of the 
ECHR and Protocol 12 of that Convention. It also stated,  
In addition to the discriminatory impact on foreign national family migrants from non-
western countries, the overseas integration test also indirectly discriminates against 
individual Dutch citizens and residents from non-western migrant communities, 
particularly those of Turkish and Moroccan origins…members of these communities 
are also disproportionately impacted by financial requirements for sponsoring family 
training and reunification….Members of “non-western” migrant communities are more 
likely to bring family members from abroad to the Netherlands than “native” Dutch 
persons, and far more likely to bring family members from “non-western” countries 
than migrants from “western” countries living in the Netherlands.
160 
The question of who pays for the costs of the civic integration programmes (the state or TCNs 
themselves) is also of special importance from a non-discrimination perspective. The financial 
risks and cover pertaining to the civic integration tests within the host country and abroad is 
                                                      
158 Following the same selection logic, the so-called ‘EU blue card’ has not included either integration 
conditions or measures for having access to it or for family reunification purposes. See Council Directive 
2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155/17, 18.6.2009; see also E. Guild, EU Policy on 
Labour Migration: A First Look at the Commission’s Blue Card Initiative, CEPS Policy Brief No. 145, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, November 2007. 
159 Human Rights Watch (2008), op. cit. 
160 Ibid., pp. 26–30. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State maintained in 
December 2008 that the civic integration abroad exam for family reunification purposes is lawful 
(opinion case number 200806120/1) (see http://www.ind.nl/en/inbedrijf/actueel/Eis_basisexamen 
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another factor reinforcing the exclusionary implications for certain categories of migrants. As 
explained in section 4.1.1, the pre-entry civic integration test in Denmark was expected to 
decrease the applications of ‘poorly educated’ foreigners, who would think twice before taking 
the exam given their low chances of passing it as well as their inability to cover the financial 
expenses. A similar comment can be made in relation to the Netherlands, where the financial 
costs for preparing and taking the overseas integration test and the inburgeringsexamen 
represent a very important barrier for TCNs having the opportunity to become civically 
integrated.  
Who does the nation-state have in mind when testing for its ‘national values’? In respect of 
whom is it saying that ‘their values’ are not ‘our values’ and are even contrary to fundamental 
rights? Civic integration tests follow an axiom according to which certain categories of 
immigrants, particularly Muslims, by definition do not comply with fundamental rights and ‘our 
liberal democratic values’.
161 The debate around civic integration does not always relate to those 
perceived as rich, wealthy and highly skilled migrants, neither to the nationals of EU member 
states. These privileged categories of persons on the move are not those targeted or perceived as 
a threat to the identity and social welfare system of the receiving state. Instead, civic integration 
measures are primarily destined for certain immigrant groups and in practice affect those 
categories in a rather disproportionate manner. These factors open up an interesting debate 
about the link between the economic interests of the state as a requirement for the non-national 
to fit into (and not be perceived as a threat to) its perceived national identity and set of values. 
The exemption of citizens from certain countries and of highly skilled migrants opens up 
questions of non-discrimination based on nationality, religion, ethnic origin and wealth status.
162  
6.  Europeanisation and the civic integration of TCNs 
As illustrated in section 3, EC immigration law and the EU Framework on Integration provide 
supranational venues for the transfer of certain national immigration policies and legislation 
using civic integration (in its internal and external facets) as a mechanism for migration control, 
and as a condition or exceptional measure restricting TCNs’ access to security of residence, 
social solidarity and inclusion. Having ‘more Europe’ in policies for the migration and 
integration of TCNs has meant that the common EU policy is now a vehicle for legitimising and 
promoting certain member state policies and programmes, which use integration in a civic and 
conditional fashion. The ‘EU approach’ to integration is therefore profoundly affected by the 
very same deficits characterising member states’ civic integration laws – something that puts at 
stake the principles upon which the EU legal system has been built and which are intended to 
safeguard the legitimacy and coherency of its very foundations. The use of civic integration 
                                                      
161 J. Cesari, The Securitisation of Islam in Europe, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 15, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, April 2009. 
162 On the prohibition of discrimination, see for instance Art. 21.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
on ‘non-discrimination’, which states that “Any discrimination based on any ground such as gender, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited”. Refer also to the provision in Art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.” For an 
interpretation in relation to integration policies in Europe refer to S. Peers, “New Minorities: What Status 
for Third-Country Nationals in the EU System?”, in G.N. Toggenburg (ed.), Minority Protection and the 
Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward, Local Government and Public Service Reform 
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(within and outside the destination country) as one of the derogative clauses in the hands of the 
EU member states for the attribution of EC rights and freedoms provided by the EC directives 
(especially Directives 2003/109/EC and 2003/86/EC) endangers the proportionality, legitimacy 
and ambitions of EC immigration law.  
That notwithstanding, are the member states completely ‘free’ in the use of civic integration 
measures and conditions now falling within the scope of EC immigration law? One of the 
immediate consequences of the progressive Europeanisation processes in immigration law is 
that member states’ discretionary powers in the allocation of rights and security of residence to 
TCNs are diminished and subject to the EC rule of law. In contrast to the policy developments 
in the EU Framework on Integration, member states’ actions within the scope of EC law are 
subject to the supervision carried out by the European Commission and the judicial control and 
interpretation provided by the ECJ (and the development through its jurisprudence of the 
general principles of EC law).
163 The foundations and institutional arrangements characterising 
the EU legal system increasingly demarcate the boundaries for the legality of member states’ 
discretion in the context of EC immigration law. They aim at ensuring the essence of the rights 
and procedural guarantees that EC law grants to individuals (including TCNs) do not mutate in 
the national arena through some sort of transposition against its principles and guiding 
parameters. As Groenendijk (2006) has pointed out, “many special administrative techniques and 
barriers applied only in immigration law, such as extremely high fees, exclusion of judicial 
control, or excessively one-sided interpretations of general rules of administrative law…are no 
longer possible”.
164  
By inserting integration measures and conditions into some of the articles of Directives 
2003/109/EC and 2003/86/EC, member states’ action must now not only comply with the 
objectives and provisions thereby stipulated, but also with the general principles of EC law 
developed by the ECJ jurisprudence, such as that of proportionality. Both the Directive on long-
term resident status and that on family reunification offer an EU framework of rights, freedoms 
and guarantees to TCNs that all participating EU member states need to uphold in practice. Any 
exceptions applicable to those rights will be closely monitored by the Commission and the ECJ. 
This oversight has been confirmed by the ruling in the ECJ case European Parliament v. 
Council.
165 In the case ruling, the ECJ offered a fundamental contribution to the interpretation of 
the limits of member states’ action with respect to fundamental rights while implementing EC 
immigration law, and the discretion that Directive 2003/86/EC leaves them in relation to 
derogations from these rights. This ruling also reduced the exceptions and margin of 
appreciation that the main body of the Directive on the right to family reunification might have 
offered to member states in the phase of national implementation, including the use of civic 
integration measures and conditions.
166 The Court ruled that any integration should have, 
according to Recital 12 of the Preamble of this Directive, the general objective of “facilitating 
the integration of third-country nationals in Member States by making family life possible 
through reunification”. 
                                                      
163 Art. 226 EC Treaty sets out the infringement procedure applied by the European Commission in those 
cases where it considers that a member state has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties. Art. 234 
TEC outlines the preliminary ruling procedure. See respectively chapters 12 on “Enforcement Mechanisms 
against Member States” and 13 on “Preliminary Rulings” in Craig and de Búrca (2007), op. cit. 
164 K. Groenendijk, “Citizens and Third Country Nationals: Differential Treatment or Discrimination?”, in 
J.Y. Carlier and E. Guild (eds), The Future of Free Movement of Persons in the EU, Collection du Centre 
des Droits de L’Homme de la’Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels: Bruylant, 2006(b), pp. 79–101. 
165 See Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council, 27 June 2006, [2006] ECR I-5769. 
166 D. Martin, “Comments on European Parliament v. Council (Case C-540/03 of 27 June 2006)”, European 
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The limited degree of discretion held by member states when transposing EC immigration law 
in their domestic legal systems has also been confirmed by the European Commission report on 
the application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (COM(2008) 
610).
167 Here the Commission confirmed that “[t]he objective of such (national integration) 
measures is to facilitate the integration of family members. Their admissibility under the main 
text and preamble of the Directive depends on whether they serve this purpose.” The same 
Commission Report on the application of Directive 2003/86/EC stated that  
The admissibility of integration measures under the Directive depends on whether they 
respect the principle of proportionality. Their admissibility can be questioned on the 
basis of the accessibility of such courses or tests, how they are designed and/or 
organised (test materials, fees, venue, etc.), whether such measures or their impact 
serve purposes other than integration (e.g. high fees excluding low-income families). 
The procedural safeguards to ensure the right to mount a legal challenge should also be 
respected. 
In light of the comparative analysis of selected member states in section 4, we conclude that the 
conditions highlighted by the ECJ and the Commission for the admissibility of integration 
measures (including most pertinently those of a civic nature) remain questionable and pose a 
series of deficits in relation to the general principles of proportionality and non-discrimination. 
These deficits, we argue, undermine the goals of Directives 2003/109/EC (ensuring security of 
residence and that the main criterion for acquiring the status of long-term resident is the length 
of residence)
168 and 2003/86/EC (making family life possible)
169 and the substance of EC rights 
that they provide for TCNs in the EU. It is finally worth remembering that Recital 5 of the 
Explanatory Memorandum of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification states 
that  
Member States should give effect to the provisions of this Directive without 
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other opinions, membership of 
a national minority, fortune, birth, disabilities, age or sexual orientation. 
7. Conclusions 
Civic integration measures and conditions for TCNs are illustrative of the struggles underway 
between nationalism and Europeanisation in immigration and integration policies in Europe. 
Certain EU member states have managed to fundamentally transform some of the traditional 
conceptual understandings of the integration of immigrants in EC law. These understandings 
have moved away from focusing on TCNs’ social inclusion, security of residence and access to 
                                                      
167 European Commission, Report on the Application of the Directive 2003/86/EC on the Right to Family 
Reunification, COM(2008) 610, Brussels, 8 October 2008(a). 
168 According to Recital 12 of the Explanatory Memorandum of Directive 2003/109/EC, “[i]n order to 
constitute a genuine instrument for the integration of long-term residents into society in which they live, 
long-term residents should enjoy equality of treatment with citizens of the Member State in a wide range 
of economic and social matters, under the relevant conditions defined by this Directive”. See also Recital 
6. 
169 Recital 4 of the Explanatory Memorandum of Directive 2003/86/EC states, “[f]amily reunification is a 
necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the 
integration of third country nationals in the Member State.” Also Recital 12 stipulates, “[t]he possibility 
of limiting the right to family reunification of children over the age of 12, whose primary residence is not 
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rights to seeing integration as an instrument of a restrictive immigration policy, in the form of 
conditions in immigration law for having access to a visa or a residence permit. This change is 
particularly apparent in the introduction of integration conditions and measures within the body 
of Directives 2003/109/EC and 2003/86/EC, which mainly represent derogative clauses in the 
hands of national administrations when determining the allocation of EC rights and procedural 
guarantees to TCNs. It has been particularly during the phase of national transposition of these 
Directives that the civic dimensions of integration have been reinforced and have further 
proliferated across the national arenas in Europe. The promotion of civic integration policies by 
some EU member states has also taken place through the exchange of ‘good practices’ and 
‘lessons learned’ among member states representatives in the scope of the EU Framework on 
Integration as well as the financial support provided by the European integration fund. The 
common EU immigration policy is thus granting an increasingly prominent role to civic 
integration programmes and policies for TCNs.  
This paper has conducted a comparative assessment of the deficits inherent to the intended 
public goals, personal and material scope of civic integration programmes in Denmark, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands. Both the internal and external dimensions of these programmes, 
which require TCNs to demonstrate knowledge of the values, way of life, history and 
institutions, pose major issues with respect to the principles of proportionality and non-
discrimination. The relationship between civic integration and proportionality is a special cause 
for concern, given the intrinsically subjective nature of civic integration examinations, their 
mandatory nature and the sanctions applied in the event of an applicant’s non-compliance. The 
disproportionate nature of a majority of these measures is exacerbated by the intended public 
goal pursued, i.e. limiting the entries of TCNs for family reunion and of reducing the number of 
long-term residence permits. Furthermore, the differential treatment applying to the personal 
scope and the exemption of certain categories of (‘Western’, highly skilled and rich) foreigners 
from the obligation to pass the civic test leads to the incompatibility of civic integration 
measures with the principle of non-discrimination.  
This paper has also sought to examine the implications of using civic integration as a condition 
for TCNs to have access to the rights provided in EC immigration law and the multifaceted 
effects emerging from an increasing Europeanisation of migration law at the EU level. It has 
argued that by subjecting the access to EC rights and guarantees granted by EC immigration law 
to civic integration programmes and tests, the member states’ strategies have been to gain back 
their national sovereignty when determining who is entitled to rights and liberty, and who is 
included and can claim membership of the EU polity. The deficits identified in the four EU 
member states analysed have thus been transferred to the common EU immigration policy – 
something that endangers its compatibility with the general principles of the rule of law and 
fundamental rights. Yet, the results of Europeanisation in immigration law also make integration 
conditions subject to supervision by the European Commission and judicial oversight by the 
ECJ, which are there to ensure that the substance and goals of the EU rights and freedoms of 
individuals are respected and not subject to exceptional public measures beyond the remits of 
the rule of law.  
The nexus between a secure immigration status and adherence to national/European identity 
leads to the stigmatisation of the vulnerable foreigner who is in search of security of residence 
and social solidarity. Integration paradoxically contributes to social exclusion and insecurity of 
the vulnerable migrant who is required to know and understand (and in some cases disappear 
into) national values and identity for legal entry and residence in the EU. Europeanisation 
processes do not bring legitimacy to nationalistic approaches to the integration of TCNs rooted 
in conservative perceptions and stereotypes, which view heterogeneity and diversity as 
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deviations in need of correcting or as threats to ‘social cohesion’. The common EU immigration 
policy should not legitimise the continuance of these critical national practices and restrictive 
immigration policies by adding a ‘European identity’ dimension to civic programmes/tests. 
Instead, a post-national approach should be favoured. This approach should continue fostering 
the more traditional approaches to integration in EU law and policy, which considered the 
integration of TCNs a process of social inclusion leading to equality and membership of all 
individuals (independent of their nationality and citizenship) in Europe. 
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